

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

DEPARTMENT OF ARCHAEOLOGY

**CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL
LIBRARY**

CALL No. 954.4205 J.P.H.S.

D.G.A. 79.



1

Recd
14.11.41
35 ✓

057

C-1

JOURNAL

of the

PANJAB UNIVERSITY

HISTORICAL SOCIETY

(Incorporating the Panjab Historical Society.)

VOL. VII.

DECEMBER 1941.

PAGE.

THE EAST INDIA COMPANY AND PERSIA (1800—1810)

P. N. Kirpal. 1

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND MAHARAJA

RANJIT SINGH (1809—1814) S. L. Bhalla. 67

Editorial Board

J. F. BRUCE, EsQ., M.A. (OXON.), M.A. (SYD.),
University Professor of History, Lahore.

R. R. SETHI, EsQ., M.A. (ECON. AND HIST.).
University Lecturer in History, Lahore.

REV. ROSS WILSON, M.A. (CHICAGO),
Professor of History, F. C. College, Lahore.

THE EAST INDIA COMPANY AND PERSIA (1800-1810).

The opening years of the 19th century form an interesting and instructive period in the history of the East India Company. The ability and finesse of Lord Clive, the practical genius and foresight of Warren Hastings, the aristocratic respectability of Earl Cornwallis and the imperial flair and military conquests of Lord Wellesley and his brother, had brought into being a magnificent Empire of English merchants in the East. The mercantile character was being relegated to the background and the Company's Government in India was rapidly assuming an imperial role. Government became more important than dividends. While the East India Company was yet primarily a commercial concern in the eyes of an average English politician at home, the soldier and the statesman in India began to be conscious of the feeling that they represented an Imperial State.

The relationship of this *de facto* state to the Home Government was still far from clear. The legislative enactments which governed the constitution of the Company at this stage were half-hearted measures, aiming at feeble compromises. The King's Government and the Parliament neither wished to nor succeeded in grasping the facts of the Indian situation. The facts, too, were of a dynamic nature. The distance of India from England, the consequent slowness of communications, the waning interest of the British public in the affairs of the Company, and the daily experience of Government in India, tended to create a tradition of independence among the Company's servants in the East. The Company's Government in India exercised in effect functions of a sovereign State. Till the Crown formally took over the responsibility for the government of British possessions in India and the shadow of the Mughal Emperors vanished from Delhi on the failure of the Rebellion in 1858, the conception of sovereignty was formally in abeyance in India, but, and because of that, it was being vigorously asserted in practice. The Government of India was chary of interference from the Home Government even when the latter had the means of enforcing its will regularly and promptly. For a short time following the successes of Wellesley the Indian authorities fancied themselves almost distinct

954.4205
J.P.H.S.

33373

23.1.58

254.42-5/J.P.H.S.

from and independent of the King's Government in London. The relations of the East India Company with Persia during 1800-10 form the Company's first important essay in foreign policy outside India and bring out this tendency to exercise the functions of sovereignty and an unwillingness to submit to control from London.

Apart from this constitutional aspect leading to the clash of authorities between Calcutta and Whitehall, a study of British relations with Persia throws much light on the extent of the French menace in the East during the period of Napoleonic successes. This study also reveals the genesis of the policy of defending British interests in the East from a possible invasion by a European Power through the Middle East, and North-Western Frontier of India. The story of these early Persian missions has often been dismissed as an unimportant and unseemly wrangle between two individuals. But the story needs to be retold in the light of its many-sided interest and of the deeper issues involved in the quarrels between Sir John Malcolm and Sir Harford Jones. The following study is based upon the correspondence of the Board of Control, the Foreign Office and the Supreme Government at Calcutta, and on the letters of the English envoys to Persia.

During 1798-99 there was much talk of the projected invasion of India by Zeman Shah, King of Afghanistan. Lord Wellesley's vigorous policy of territorial expansion and the growing consciousness of the paramountcy of the East India Company in the Indian peninsula, led the Government at Calcutta to look to the Khyber Pass and beyond for the defence of British possessions in the East. The earliest political contacts of the Company's Government with Persia originated not from a fear of France or Russia but from the menace of an Afghan invasion. Though the Marahattas had undoubtedly become the strongest Indian power in the country, yet the possibility of a united effort by the Moslem powers, led by the Amir of Afghanistan, remained, and appeared real and threatening during the last decade of the 18th century. The English had no exact knowledge of the conditions and resources of the countries bordering on the North-Western Frontier. But past history, tradition, and the intrigues of the Indian powers exaggerated the sense of danger from this quarter. The military feat of Ahmad Shah Durrani at the field

of Panipat in 1765 was still fresh in men's memory. Zeman Shah's invasions of the Punjab pointed to a larger design. It was difficult to realise that between the Afghan King and his alleged ambitions stood the formidable, though as yet unconsolidated, power of the Sikhs, the fighting forces of the Marahatta confederacy, and the highly organised military and material resources of the East India Company. For the time being the Afghan danger created hopes among the Moslem princes, panic among the people and a scare in the Government circles at Calcutta. Reports of the correspondence of Zeman Shah with the Emperor at Delhi, the ruler of Oudh, and many Moslem and Rajput princes came daily. The Afghan invasion was a subject of anxious gossip in the bazars and cities of Northern India. In this state of panic Lord Wellesley turned nearer home to the affairs of Oudh. The problem of the defence of Oudh was eventually solved by its disappearance as a buffer State under the treaty of 1801. But Lord Wellesley was not the man to confine himself to limited measures. His imagination moved beyond the Khyber and he proposed to deal with the question of Indian defence in Afghanistan and Persia.

It is interesting to observe that the person whom the East India Company first employed for diplomatic service in Persia was an Indian. Mehdi Ali Khan was of Persian origin but had settled down in India and had spent his early life as an adventurer. He was reputed to be a man of notorious character and had been publicly disgraced by Azim-ool-Omrah for committing robbery in the house of a Syed in Hyderabad.¹ Later he entered the service of Mr. Duncan and was usefully employed by him at Ghazee-pore. His superiors thought highly of Mehdi Ali Khan's ability and loyalty. When the Company was engaged in war against Tipu Sultan and Zeman Shah threatened to invade the weak and undefended territory of Oudh, Duncan, as Governor of Bombay, entrusted Mehdi Ali Khan with an unofficial mission to Persia. The object of the mission was to exercise secret influence at Tehran in favour of persuading the Persian Government to make a diversion against Afghanistan. In this he displayed much adroitness and eventually succeeded—though the success was largely due to circumstances beyond his control.

1. Malcolm to Col. Kirkpatrick—letter from Hyderabad.

In 1798, from Bushire Mehdi Ali Khan, in his private capacity, opened a correspondence with the Persian King and his ministers. He described the Company as the zealous and powerful protector of the Shia inhabitants of the Punjab, whose sufferings at the hands of the fanatical Zeman Shah he described in glowing terms. He encouraged the disaffection existing in Afghanistan against Zeman Shah and assisted the expedition of the two princes Mahmood and Feroze Shah. The King of Persia professed sympathy with the fugitive princes and had his own designs on Khorassan and Kandahar. The threatening attitude of the Persian Government made Zeman Shah abandon the projected invasion of India and hasten from Peshawar to Herat to watch his western frontier. The Persian King appeared to be committed to hostilities against Afghanistan and Mehdi Ali Khan found the object of his secret mission already accomplished. When he reached Tehran he was received with great honours but he withheld the purport of his mission from the Persian Government and gave out that he had been sent by the Company to condole with the King on the death of his uncle and to congratulate him on his auspicious succession; to this effect he forged a letter from Mr. Duncan to the King of Persia, the true letter having represented him as a man charged with power to make any agreement he chose.¹ By much ability and clever deception Mehdi Ali Khan created a good impression of the Company's might in Persia and avoided needless expense and definite commitments against Afghanistan on the part of the Indian Government.

Before he took leave Mehdi Ali Khan had a long conversation with the Persian King, at which only the Prime Minister was present. The King asked his advice whether the expedition to Khorassan and Kandahar, which he swore by his head to prosecute, should be proclaimed as a war of religion or one of ambition. Mehdi Ali Khan objected to both grounds which, he said, would unite rather than divide the Afghans; he advised the King to support Prince Mahmood against his brother and thus secure the help of a faction of the Afghans. The King accepted this advice.²

Mehdi Ali Khan's secret mission, conducted in an almost stinging style, was an expedient of the moment. Though it appeared

1. The Journals of Sir John Malcolm.

2. *Ibid.*

to have served the interests of the Company, yet it lacked the largeness of conception and the outward ostentation, characteristic of Lord Wellesley's statesmanship. In the volatile imagination of this pro-consul the Afghan menace continued to assume large proportion and he thought of the possibility of a French invasion of India from the North-West. The paramountcy of the English Company in India, which he aspired to realise, made the defence of the frontier his close concern. At any rate the negotiations between the Indian Government and Persia could not be left to the shady transactions of a native agent. The Company's Government in India was great enough to deal on a footing of equality with the Kingdom of Persia. An open mission on a scale compatible with the prestige of the Company seemed to be clearly indicated and Wellesley proceeded to appoint one.

In August 1799 the Governor-General appointed Captain John Malcolm as Envoy to the Court of Persia. The leading objects of this mission were "to relieve India from the annual alarm of Zeman Shah's invasion, which is always attended with serious expense to the Company, by occasioning a diversion upon his Persian provinces; to counteract the possible attempts of those villainous but active democrats the French; to restore to some part of its former prosperity a trade which has been in a great degree lost.¹"

Malcolm was thirty years old at the time of his appointment. Beginning subaltern life in Southern India at the age of fourteen he had exhibited such courage and ability as to be promoted in 1796 to the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief at Madras. Lord Wellesley, on his arrival in India, was very favourably struck with Malcolm's ability and employed him in political service at Hyderabad and Mysore. Malcolm soon conceived strong attachment to Wellesley and his ideas and became a favourite with the Supreme Government at Calcutta.

When Malcolm received intelligence of his appointment as Envoy he was in Madras, from where he hurried to Bombay to make preparations for his voyage. The Hon. Jonathan Duncan, Governor of Bombay, acquainted him with information relevant to his

¹ Captain Malcolm to General Ross, 10th August, 1799.

mission, from the correspondence of Mr. Manesty, the Company's Agent at Bushire, Mr. (afterwards Sir Harford) Jones, the Agent at Baghdad, and Mehdi Ali Khan. Captain Malcolm, accompanied by the other gentlemen of the mission, left Bombay for the Persian Gulf on 29th of December, 1799. The party reached Muscat on the 8th of January, 1800. Its Arab ruler Syed Sultan had been involved in the intrigues of Tipu Sultan and the French, but had lately dismissed his French physician and had asked for an Englishman to look after his health. Malcolm had brought the assistant surgeon Bogle, who was to serve as English political agent. When Malcolm arrived, he found the Imaum campaigning in some neighbouring islands. He met Syfe Ben Mohammed, the Governor of Muscat, and impressed upon him the advantages of an English alliance and the might of the East India Company. He set out in search of the Imaum and had an interview with him near the island of Kishm, where the letter from the Governor-General was delivered to the Arab Chief. The Imaum appreciated Malcolm's presents even more than the despatches of the Indian Government and readily acceded to the English request for establishing a political agency in Muscat. A preliminary agreement to this effect was signed.

On the 1st of February, Malcolm entered the port of Bushire, where the Company had a factory and an accredited agent. The chief merchants of the town welcomed the English Mission. Sheikh Nuseer, the Governor of Bushire, accorded honours to Malcolm and received presents from the English Envoy. From Bushire Malcolm despatched letters regarding his mission to the Persian King and his prime minister at Tehran and to the Prince-Royal at Shiraz, and waited for replies. On the 4th of March, the Prince-Royal sent a reply which was written in the style of a *firman* or mandate, commencing with the word *Hookum*, the form used by a ruler in addressing his subjects. Malcolm returned this communication saying that as the envoy of the Governor-General he could not receive such a letter and that he deserved a *Moorasellah*, which was the form observed by a King when addressing his Wazeer. Three weeks later the Prince's Court at Shiraz answered Malcolm's objections by defending their procedure. It was contended that, as the Governor-General was only the Wazeer of the King of England, Malcolm's rank as delegate must necessarily be below that of

Wazeer. Malcolm did not accept this explanation and declared that the Governor-General was not a Wazeer, but a Viceroy and, as such, entitled to correspond on terms of equality with the King of Persia. He added that Tipu Sultan had corresponded with the King of Persia as an equal and the Governor-General ruled over a larger territory than Tipu ever governed. The ministers at Shiraz were not impressed by these arguments and decided to refer the point in dispute to the King at Tehran.

On the 13th of May Malcolm's *moonshee* brought a reply from Tehran, in which the King expressed professions of joy at the arrival of the English Mission. Malcolm received the letter with great pomp. On the 22nd, accompanied by his suite, consisting of six European gentlemen, two European servants, two surveying boys, forty-two troopers of the Madras Native Cavalry, 49 Bombay Grenadiers, 68 Indian servants and followers, 103 Persian attendants and 236 servants and followers with immense baggage loaded on camels and mules, Malcolm set out for Shiraz. On the 15th of June, the Embassy entered the city of Shiraz in an impressive procession. The mission was received with honour, but difficulties of form again appeared while making arrangements for the meeting between the prince and the envoy. The points in dispute were whether the prince should incline his head and shoulders on giving the envoy the signal to be seated, whether the gentlemen of the English Mission should be seated during the interview and at what point during the interview the ceremonial cup of coffee was to be offered to the envoy. These points were hotly contested and eventually Malcolm had his way, but not before he threatened to withdraw his mission. Even then the Persian ministers were not to be defeated. During the interview the master of the ceremonies made him sit in a chair lower than the one which had been decided upon during the preliminary arrangements. With considerable difficulty Malcolm checked his first impulse of retiring from the Chamber. "Considering the extreme youth of the prince, the marks of favour I had received from the King, and the peculiar situation of the country, I restrained myself from an act which, agreeably to the customs of Persia, would have been deemed a very violent one, which might easily have been misrepresented, and which would probably have weakened the authority of the Prince-

Regent's Government. Impelled by these strong motives, I seated myself for a few minutes, and then took my leave."¹ When he had taken his leave Malcolm was still very indignant and hurled abuses at the Mehmendar responsible for the arrangement of the ceremonial. The Mehmendar went to the minister, who wrote an apologetic letter to Malcolm in a most flowery style, but held the matter to be of trifling importance and suggested that the English Envoy had deliberately taken a lower place out of respect for the prince. Malcolm continued to be furious and demanded sufficient apology. The second letter was as unsatisfactory as the first. But the notable persons of the town paid him visits to appease his anger; they only made matters worse by their frivolous attitude. At long last he succeeded in extracting a suitable apology.

"The consequence," wrote Malcolm in his Journal, "attached to these points of form in Persia exceeds belief; and from the intensity shown by the representatives of a country on such subjects, they chiefly form their opinion of the greatness and consequence of the power from which he is deputed." It is true that the stickling on forms was often carried to a ridiculous extent by the Persian Court, but it is equally true that it was seldom allowed to obstruct the desirable objects of diplomacy. The ministers of an autocratic king or of princely governors in the provinces of a country steeped in ancient tradition, convinced of its greatness, and insistent on their own notions of courtly etiquette, naturally took meticulous care and wasted considerable time in arranging points of ceremonial. It seems, however, that very often the stickling was deliberately prolonged to gain time, and in the case of Malcolm's mission there was a real difficulty, which arose from the uncertain and unique position of the Governor-General and the East India Company in international law. The legal issues involved in the exercise of sovereignty by the British in India had not been resolved; they had not been even clearly faced.

The relation of the Company to the shadowy authority of the Mughal Emperor was still obscure. Malcolm wrote from Ispahan: "The Tedwy-Shah-Aulum in the Marquis' seal would be the occasion of much difficulty, and might give the King a pretext to

1. Malcolm's Journal.

show his greatness, and put a bar on all my proceedings. I have, therefore, after much consideration, put the Company's large seal with the credentials on the King's letter, and a smaller one on the credentials. The impression of the seal in the inside of the letter is so indistinct, that there is nothing to be read from it but the 'Kishwar-i-Hind': so it cannot betray us. I am not at all pleased with this transaction, and am not assured the Marquis will. I have acted, as far as my judgment goes, for the best."¹ The Persian Court had good reason in holding that the Governor-General at Calcutta was not the Viceroy of the King of England. But at the same time it was true that the East India Company ruled over large territories and in actual practice it was undoubtedly one of the great powers in the East. The gulf between the *de facto* power and greatness of the Company and the vagueness of its *de jure* position, which smacked of inferiority, was to no small extent at the root of diplomatic difficulties in Persia during this period.

The stickling for forms being over, Malcolm proceeded with the distribution of presents on a very liberal scale. This made him popular and enhanced the prestige of the East India Company in the eyes of those who received curious novelties. Though the Persians were extravagant in expressions of politeness, yet the presents were accepted in a sordid manner, which seemed rude to the English Envoy. It was customary in Persia to ask the value of the present before accepting it, and if the value in money was not impressive, the recipient considered himself personally slighted. Often the protests led to prolonged haggling till an article of suitable value was decided upon. During this period of feasting and receptions Malcolm employed his leisure hours in collecting information about the country and its people. "I am trying to get some good books, but the task is difficult. There are few modern writers of celebrity, and the ancient authors are to be procured both cheaper and better in India. If this country ever again enjoys repose, it will overflow, as usual, with poetical productions. The men appear to me all poets. Their conversation is elegant, pointed and witty; and was it not too often spoilt by flattery, would be the pleasantest in the world."² About this time, the idea of writing his

1. Malcolm to Mr. Edmonstone: Ispahan, Oct. 27th, 1800.

2. Malcolm to Mr. Edmonstone, Persian Translator to the Supreme Government. Shiraz, July 26, 1800.

well known History of Persia was conceived. He wrote to his father, "I employ every leisure hour in researches into the history of this extraordinary country, with which we are but little acquainted. . . I shall, I trust, collect materials that will either enable myself, or some one better qualified, to give much information on this subject." And then the mystical faith in the British constitution, characteristic of his generation: "The climate of this country is delightful. Had it the constitution of Great Britain, its inhabitants need not sigh for Paradise. As it is, I would rather live on Douglas Hill".

From Shiraz the mission proceeded to Ispahan, the ancient capital of the Persian Empire, and still "though fallen from its former greatness, beyond all compare the richest and most populous city in Persia." The mission was received with much pageantry and remained in the town for more than a month. Malcolm was giving much thought to the objects of English policy in Persia and was collecting important information. On October 9, 1800, he wrote to Mr. Edmonstone: "You may rest assured that Zeman Shah can do nothing in India before the setting in of the rains in 1801. He has not time, even if he had the power for such an attempt; and by the blessing of God, he will, for some years to come, be too much engaged in this quarter to think of any other. . . . Accounts are gloomy both from Europe and Egypt. Those rascals, the French, will persuade the Turks that they are their best friends before they have done; and if they succeed in establishing themselves in Egypt, on any terms, we must look to every quarter, and to none with more care than the Persian Gulf."²

On reaching Tehran the English Envoy and the members of his suite were given public audience by the King on the 16th of November and a few days later at another audience Malcolm delighted the Persian Monarch and his ministers with gorgeous presents offered on a lavish scale. Malcolm's mission was much criticised on account of its extravagance. He defended his lavish presents thus: "I had good grounds to conclude that my conduct on this point will enable me to carry both the political and commercial objects of my mission, without subjecting the Government to any heavy engagements;

-
1. Malcolm to his father. Shiraz. August 17, 1800.
 2. Malcolm's Journal.

and that, at all events, the King would be so pleased as to have had no hesitation in making a campaign to Khorassan next season—a subject in which I had reason to think there was a difference of opinion among the ministers—and this in itself appeared an object of primary importance. Secondly, so great a present is in consistency with the style of the mission ; and I may venture to say, will put it almost out of the power of an European nation to rival it in a country where so much depends on show and expense as in Persia. Thirdly, in proportion to this particular act the conduct of the King must, to a certain degree, be regulated in the Embassy which he sends to the Governor-General ; and not only the dignity of the British Government will be advanced, but the present expense in some measure met, by the value of the presents he sends on that occasion. Fourthly, not only my personal consequence, which is of the least import to my success, will be established, and the most honourable treatment secured, but all tongues will be silenced—none daring to speak in this country against a man with whom the sovereign is pleased. And, fifthly, it is probable that my stay in Persia will be shortened two months by my negotiations being facilitated—a circumstance which, if it takes place, will meet the additional expense.”¹ There is good deal of force in his arguments. The magic of presents could produce quick and wholesome results in Persia.

Many months had now been spent on ceremonies and entertainments and Malcolm was eager to push on with the business of the mission. With the passage of time the main object of the mission was losing importance. From Calcutta and Lucknow the dread of Zeman Shah's invasion had looked serious ; from Tehran the Afghan prince could be seen in a proper perspective. Internal rebellions threatened the Amir ; the invasion of Khorassan by the Persians kept him in the western parts of his Kingdom ; and with considerable ingenuity Futteh Ali Shah fomented Prince Mahmood against his brother. Far from emulating the exploits of Mahmood Ghazanavi or Muhammad Ghorî, the ruler of Afghanistan found himself surrounded by dangerous enemies among his own turbulent people and pitted against the resources of Persia. In these

1. Malcolm's Journal.

circumstances the Political Treaty with Persia, which was intended to be aimed mainly against Afghanistan, no longer seemed to be an object of urgent importance. Relieved of this pressing need of his government, Malcolm could try to wrest some advantages for the Company out of the diplomatic negotiations in which he now entered with the Persian Government.

Haji Ibrahim Khan, the Chief Minister, was appointed to negotiate the treaty with the British Ambassador. Malcolm suggested that a commercial treaty between the two powers was very desirable, but he professed indifference as regards a political treaty. He could afford to bluff, because the danger from Zeman Shah had practically passed away.¹ The Persian minister desired both commercial and political treaties and requested Malcolm to prepare the drafts.

On the 3rd of December, Malcolm presented the documents embodying drafts of the proposed treaties to the Persian minister. The articles of the Commercial Treaty were very favourable to the British Government. There was to be unrestricted trade between Persia and British India and the English were to have the right of establishing factories wherever they pleased on the coast or interior of Persia. The jurisdiction to try Persian subjects was allowed to English factories and exemption from payment of taxes and other imposts was also conceded to the Company. The most important article, however, was the demand for the cession to the Company of the islands of Kisham, Aujam and Khargh in the Persian Gulf. The Political Treaty declared mutual friendship between the two countries and contained provisions calculated to deter Zeman Shah from invading India, and the French from gaining a foothold in Persia. In the form of marginal memoranda Malcolm argued for each article, repeatedly pressing upon the Persian Government the hateful, democratic and republican aberrations of the French revolutionaries. While Malcolm was dwelling upon the godlessness of the Revolutionary Government in Paris, news arrived that the French had evacuated Egypt. With these welcome tidings the imminence of French advance to the East disappeared and Malcolm again began to show greater keenness for the Commercial Treaty than for the Political Treaty.

1. Malcolm's Journal,

The stipulation in the commercial Treaty regarding the cession of the islands raised a storm of opposition in the Persian Court. The King himself was alarmed. The courtiers reminded him how out of insignificant bits of territories in India the English merchants had managed to swallow large principalities and create an Empire. In Futteh Ali's mind there was no doubt of the Company's great ingenuity and greater appetite for the acquisition of territory and he resolved that Persia should not suffer the fate of India. Malcolm tried to beat down the opposition by giving its leader Mirza Sheffee a bribe in money. The Mirza accepted the bribe, but continued to oppose. In fact, there was no possibility of the Persian Government agreeing to the cession of the islands. By asking for territory in the Persian Gulf, Malcolm raised in the minds of the Persian ministers a very strong suspicion regarding the motives of the Company. The English envoy had to withdraw this article from the proposed commercial Treaty. He justified his course of action in the following words :

"The reason of my hitherto pressing it (cession of islands) so much on this court has been chiefly to facilitate the other parts of the negotiation, which it has effectually done. The demand for these islands has at once satisfied shortsighted, ignorant men of the cause of my embassy, and the great expenses incurred, for which they were at a loss to account; and the political part of my mission has thence appeared a just and equal, but a subordinate object. It has been, in consequence, easily concluded, which the avarice of the Court would have prevented, had they ever dreamt it was the principal object of the Embassy."¹

At last the protracted negotiations came to a close. The two treaties were formally drawn up and signed by Malcolm and Haji Ibrahim. The Persian Government refused to affix the royal seal or royal signature to these treaties on the ground that the Governor-General of India, who was at most only a viceroy, possessed a rank much inferior to the King of Persia. Instead a *firman* from the King was attached under the royal seal to each of the treaties, calling upon all the officers of the State to fulfil its prescribed conditions. The treaties were yet to be ratified by the English Government and for this purpose it was agreed that

1. Malcolm's Journal.

a Persian nobleman, Haji Khalil Khan, should be despatched immediately to India. Malcolm was glad at the conclusion of his business and made preparations to return to India. On his way back he paid a diplomatic visit to the Pacha of Baghdad. After a short stay at Baghdad the mission embarked on board the "Governor Duncan" at Bussrah and reached Bushire. From Bushire they re-embarked for Bombay, which they reached on 13th May, 1801.

For diplomatic documents the treaties are strangely worded. The Persian ministers insisted on the use of high literary flourishes, which baffled the understanding of a plain soldier like the English envoy. "The preambles," wrote Malcolm, "are the most difficult papers I ever read. How often have they made me curse Mirza Raza Ruut, the Moonshec-ul-Mamalak, and all the tribe of Moustaphas, who, in defiance of reason and remonstrance, persisted in writing such bombastic nonsense. I unfortunately produced a copy of a late Indian treaty as a sample of that simplicity of style which was the best to use in engagements, though I allowed it was not elegantly written. The Mirza, after reading two articles, said he would give in his resignation to his sovereign before such a paper was copied into the records of the office over which he presided."¹ The Mirza had his way and used his literary skill by putting most extravagant metaphors and Arabic verses into the commercial and political treaties between Persia and the East India Company.²

The Persian Court despatched their ambassador Haji Khalil Khan to India to obtain a formal ratification of both the treaties and to negotiate on some unsettled points, including the cession to the Company of the island of Kishma in the Persian Gulf.³ The Haji, accompanied by a large retinue, reached Bombay on May 21, 1802, and was detained there on account of some preliminary formalities. One day some Persian soldiers quarrelled with the Indian sepoy forming the ambassador's guard of honour. The dispute grew serious and shots were exchanged. The Haji came out to quell the tumult and was accidentally shot dead. The incident created a sensation in Bombay. Governor Duncan, an honest and

1. Malcolm to Mr. Edmonstone : H 20th Feb. 1801.

2. Treaties given in appendix.

3. Factory Records ; Persian, Vol. XXII, p. 513.

industrious civilian, lost his nerve and was completely at a loss to know how to deal with the situation. When the news reached the Supreme Government at Calcutta Lord Wellesley was momentarily stunned. Malcolm was sent to Bombay to dispose of the remains of the mission and explain matters to the Persian Court. Malcolm performed this delicate job successfully. By the liberal distribution of presents and pensions¹ the members of the embassy were reconciled. The ambassador's body was sent to Karbalah and the incident was finally settled with the Persian Court by money payments. A slight awkwardness was caused by the conduct of Mehdi Ali Khan, the Company's agent at Bushire. As soon as he heard of Haji Khalil's death, he promptly invented a story of the transaction according to which the Haji owed his death entirely to his own folly and misconduct. Mehdi Ali Khan's account conflicted with Malcolm's explanation to the Persian King and his ministers and this false account had to be repudiated. So heavily did the Company pay to compensate the death of Haji Khalil Khan and so lightly did the Persian Court think of these incidents that it was said afterwards at Shiraz that the English might kill ten ambassadors, if they would pay for them at the same rate.

On account of Haji Khalil's murder Malcolm's treaties remained formally unratified. The British Government lost interest in Persia for a while. The danger of Afghan invasion disappeared and the possibility of a French invasion of India through Persia had not yet become a bugbear. Although the Persian treaties were never formally ratified, yet they were not held to be invalid because of that deficiency. In fact, when the Persian Government later applied for British help against Russia on the basis of the Political Treaty, both the Supreme Government in Calcutta and the Board of Control in London declined to help because they disagreed with the Persians on the interpretation of the treaties and not because of the lack of ratification.

Nevertheless it is true that the treaties had little effect on the course of events and for this reason Malcolm's first mission to Persia must be regarded as devoid of any substantial gain. Article I of the Political Treaty proclaimed, that "the beautiful image of excellent

1. Kaye—Life and Correspondence of Malcolm.

Union shall remain fixed on the mirror of duration and perpetuity' and limited the duration of the treaty to as long as the light of the sun lasts. In spite of this long span of time allotted for the political and commercial arrangements between the East India Company and Persia, the treaties were, for all practical purposes, a dead letter from the very beginning. The responsibility for this rests, to some extent, on the Supreme Government at Calcutta, who failed to follow up the opening of relations with Persia.

Lord Wellesley justified Malcolm's mission mainly on the ground of its success in making a profound impression of the Company's power and prestige on the Persian mind.¹ Such success rests upon mere assertions and is difficult to prove or disprove. Soon after Malcolm's treaties the Persian mind showed singular susceptibility to French influences and a surprising insight into the inferiority of the constitutional status of the East India Company. The Secret Committee were right in expressing scepticism about the policy of Captain Malcolm's mission, since Mehdi Ali Khan's exertions had already succeeded in achieving the main objective of the policy of the Indian Government,² by frustrating Zeman Shah's designs upon India. Lord Wellesley's reply was not very convincing. "Independently of any disqualifications applicable to Mehdi Ali Khan, the objections to the employment of a native of India in such a mission are numerous and insurmountable. It is not consistent with the dignity of the British Government to employ any native of this country as its representative at a foreign court, nor could the British interests be with any degree of safety confided to any person of that description."³ In more spirited tone the Governor-General continued, "Intrigue, falsehood and collusion are the uniform characteristics of such of the natives of India, as aspire to the qualifications of statesmen. They are ignorant of the national honour, and insensible to every emotion of public spirit; they are, therefore, ever disposed to sacrifice the public interests to views of private ambition and individual profit." It is true that strict adherence to truth and straightforward conduct of policy were the qualities which Mehdi Ali Khan did not display during his diplomatic activities in

1. Marquis Wellesley to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors—Monghyr, 28th Sept., 1801.

2. Secret Committee to the Governor-General, 10th Sept. 1801.

3. Marquis Wellesley to Secret Committee. 28th Sept., 1801.

Persia ; but no diplomat European or native of India, including Malcolm himself, succeeded in showing any consistent or outstanding regard for these noble virtues, in the course of his official transactions. In spite of Lord Wellesley's stout defence and loud applause of his favourite, the truth remains that with infinitely less expense, Mehdi Ali Khan had accomplished more in diverting the Amir of Afghanistan to his western boundaries than all the spectacular grandeur of Malcolm's mission succeeded in achieving. As regards 'these important and comprehensive views' which Wellesley contemplated and which amounted to the conquest of Persian imagination by the display of British prestige and power, Malcolm's success was vague and nebulous. In one respect, however, the mission was productive of good and lasting results. Malcolm's interest in Persian history led subsequently to his writings on Persia, which served as the beginnings of Anglo-Persian cultural relations. But this aspect of Malcolm's work in Persia was neither political nor commercial. The conclusion of Malcolm's mission marked an end to the first phase of the relations between the East India Company and Persia during the first decade of the 19th Century.

* * * *

Border warfare between Russia and Persia was quite frequent. It assumed serious proportions after the signing of Malcolm's Treaties. Russia annexed the fertile northern province of Georgia. The Persians wanted to recover their lost territory and to escape the strain of fighting against the Russians. Persia could not achieve this object alone. In this hour of distress she began to look for friends who could relieve her. The Persian Government appealed to the Governor-General for help in accordance with the political treaty. Aga Nabi Khan, the Persian Ambassador in India, who had succeeded Haji Khalil Khan, informed the Governor-General in 1805 that unless the British helped Persia, the Shah would be compelled to seek the alliance of France.¹ The Governor-General declined the request of the Persian Government on the ground that Malcolm's Treaty was not open to the interpretation put on it by the Persians. The British had at that time an alliance with Russia and they refused to comply with the wishes of the Persian

1. Home Miscellaneous Series, 657, pp. 85-7,

Government. Moreover after Napoleon's failure in Egypt the French menace had lost some force.

But French agents continued to work in Persia. During 1804-5 Napoleon and the Shah exchanged letters. Early in 1805 Napoleon's agent M. Amédée Joubert paid a secret visit to Persia.¹ After his departure Adjutant Commander Romieu paid a visit to Tehran in October and prepared a memoir on the condition of Persia which he sent to Napoleon.²

Harford Jones, the British Resident at Baghdad, was alarmed and addressed a letter to Mirza Bozurg, first minister to the Prince Royal, and despatched a person into Persia to watch the movements of Romieu. The British Resident referred to the expression in Malcolm's Treaty, "the enemies of one state are to be considered the enemies of the other," and on the basis of this provision of the Treaty argued for the expulsion of the French agents from Persia.³ Mirza Bozurg replied that Britain had failed to observe Malcolm's Treaty by standing aloof in Persia's struggle with Russia; under the same provision quoted by the British Resident England should either render military assistance to Persia or try to mediate between the two countries⁴. Britain's indifference had compelled the Persian court to consider French advances, which seemed to offer favourable terms to Persia. The Persian ministers gave out that the French had offered support against Russia on condition that the Persians should grant to them one of the ports in the Persian Gulf and asked the English Government whether they would like to retain the friendship of Persia by successfully mediating for peace and the restoration of Georgia and part of the province of Azarbaijan.⁵ To this no reply was communicated by the British authorities. The Persians thought their representations to the British ministry neglected and began to listen to the overtures of the French. The French were keen on securing Persian assistance if they decided to march to India,⁶ and the Persian King appeared willing to grant French demands.

1. Gardane, *Mission du General Gardane*, p. 16.

2. *Idem.* p. 20.

3. Letter dated 10th Aug. 1805, from the Resident at Baghdad to Mirza Bozurg.

4. Letter from Mirza Bozurg to the Resident at Baghdad, 12th October, 1805.

5. Letter from Mirza Reza Kooli to the Resident at Baghdad, 28th October, 1805.

6. Dispatch of Owanius Pitrimto the Resident at Baghdad, 26th May, 1806.

Romieu died and was buried with much honour at Tehran. In June 1806, M. Joubert again visited Persia and carried back the proposals of the Persian Government to Napoleon.¹ Another French mission under M. Jouanin followed and M. Rouman was in charge of the negotiations till the arrival of General Gardane on December 4, 1807.² Harford Jones kept his government informed about all these transactions.

The Persian Government again asked for British help against Russia under the terms of Malcolm's Treaties.³ Lord Minto informed the Persian Government that the reception of a French embassy by the Persian Court was in direct contravention to Malcolm's Treaties and Britain's commitments were limited to the designs of the Afghans and the French. Britain could not fight against Russia, with which power she was friendly. The proposal for mediation between Russia and Persia was referred by the Governor-General to His Majesty's Government in England.⁴

The Shah sent Mirza Riza Khan to Napoleon. Riza Khan had an audience with the French Emperor at Finckenstein and on May 4, 1807, a treaty of friendship between France and Persia was drawn up.⁵ By this treaty Napoleon promised to compel Russia to evacuate Georgia and stipulated the supply of field guns and ammunition. In return the Shah was required to break off all political and commercial relations with England and to assist to his utmost any French expedition to India.

General Gardane, aide-de-camp to Napoleon, led the French mission to Persia. He brought elaborate instructions from the Emperor and was given a magnificent reception at Tehran. The Persians now welcomed France with open arms and looked to her for deliverance from the Russian menace. The Persian ambassador left Calcutta and it seemed that the English influence no longer existed at Tehran.⁶ The French mission was strongly entrenched.

1. Gardane, *Mission du General Gardane*, pp. 20-2.

2. *Idem.* p. 38.

3. Fort William. Political Department Translation of a letter from H. M. the King of Persia to H. E. Aka Mohd. Nubbee Khan received on 2nd Jan., 1807.

4. Fort William 10th Jan., 1807. Governor-General to the Persian Ambassador.

5. Gardane, *Mission . . .* pp. 71-80. Home Misc. Series, 737, p. 620.

6. Gardane, *Mission du General Gardane*, p. 616.

Such was the situation when Sir Harford Jones was appointed as His Majesty's Envoy to the Court of Persia. The appointment was a new departure in foreign policy. Hitherto British relations with Persia had been conducted by the Governor-General in India on behalf of the Company. The Court of Directors now represented to the ministers of the Crown through the President of the Board of Control that Sir Harford Jones' mission would be likely to experience a more favourable reception at the court of Persia if he were directly accredited from the King. The Foreign Office accepted this representation, but allowed the practical control of the Indian Government over the progress of the mission. The envoy was informed: "The instructions by which your conduct in the execution of your mission is to be guided, you will receive from the Court of Directors of the East India Company or from their governments in India. Any treaty is to be made in His Majesty's name. But in the event of your being directed to hold out any promise of pecuniary or military assistance you will understand that such engagements are to be made only in reference to the forces actually in India and to the funds of the East India Company, by whom also the expenses attending your mission are to be defrayed."¹

Earlier in the year Sir Harford Jones had drawn up a lengthy document relating to the purpose of the mission. He argued that the loss of British influence in the Middle East was due to the failure of the British authorities to retain the friendship of Persia after Malcolm's mission. This failure was due to sheer negligence. The French had gained the upper hand because they promised to relieve Persia from the pressure of her war with Russia. The envoy held that it was in the interests of both Russia and Britain to keep French influence out of Persia and Britain could do as much for Persia as the French had promised. Sir Harford concluded: "Asiatics and Persians always act from an interested motive and the envoy should be most positively instructed to take no more notice of the Persian Government of her engagements with France than if they had never existed. Let England once settle a peace between Persia and Russia, let her envoy conduct himself with common prudence, and the downfall of the French interests at Tehran must follow of course."² It was decided that

1. Foreign Office, George Canning to Sir Harford Jones, 28th August, 1807.
2. Sir Harford Jones, 7th January, 1807.

before reaching Tehran the envoy should visit the Court of St. Petersburg to discuss the basis on which mediation could be achieved.¹

Dundas drafted the objectives of the mission, which were approved by Canning and forwarded to the Governor-General.² Sir Harford Jones was to proceed as envoy to counteract French projects and intrigues in Persia, to report how far it was necessary to establish an embassy in Tehran, and to strive to mediate between Persia and Russia with the co-operation of the British Minister at St. Petersburg. In a secret despatch, dated 20th August, 1807, addressed to the Foreign Secretary, Dundas elaborated these objectives. The modification of Col. Malcolm's Treaty had become necessary and Dundas saw no objection to promising military assistance to Persia in order to ward off any menaced attack on British possessions in India. "There can be no objection to an engagement to furnish officers of Artillery, guns and ammunition, and also naval assistance, if necessary, on such terms as Sir Harford Jones may be able to arrange." It is interesting to note that the British Government had nothing more concrete than strong suspicion of French designs in Persia. "The necessity of the present mission having arisen almost entirely from French intrigues. . . . The attention of Sir Harford Jones ought to be particularly directed, not only to counteract all such intrigues, but also to discover, if possible, the extent to which they have been carried . . . It will also be most material to ascertain the full extent of all the propositions which the French agents may have made to Persia." The envoy was to be instructed to obtain and transmit every information relating to the state of the Afghan Government; of the relations of the King of Persia with that Government; and of his designs in respect of it, as also any discussions that had taken place or were pending between Persia and Turkey respecting the Baghdad Government. The commercial potentialities of Persia were to be carefully estimated. In case the Persian Court preferred French friendship to

-
1. Foreign Office. George Canning to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg (Lord G. L. Gower), 2nd June, 1807.
 2. Whitehall, 29th May, 1807. Dundas to Canning, Foreign Office, 30th May, 1807. Canning to Dundas.

English alliance, Dundas suggested a course of action which shows the alertness and activity of the Foreign and Political department of the East India Company at this early date. Dundas wrote: "If unfortunately French intrigues, assisted by the circumstances which have lately taken place in Poland and Turkey, may decide the Persian ministry to act a different part—in this case Sir Harford Jones ought first to use every argument; . . . but if these should be unavailing, and if it shall appear evident that no means are left of securing even the neutrality of the Persian Court, he ought then, without manifesting any displeasure or disgust, to retire to Bushire, and as there is reason to believe that till very lately there existed a prince of the Zund family, in fact the rightful heir to the throne of Persia, if this prince be still living (to whom it is imagined the inhabitants of the Southern provinces are much attached) Sir Harford Jones might endeavour to ascertain how far, by the assistance of the British Government in India, and by the supposed attachment of the Southern chiefs, it is probable that the above mentioned prince may succeed in an attempt to re-establish his family in his own person on the throne of Persia . . . If prospects are hopeful, Sir Harford Jones should be authorised to concert with the Governments in India such arrangements as shall best facilitate the restoration of the prince. . . . In the event of Sir Harford's return to Bushire it would be extremely advisable to enter, if possible in the name of the Government of India, with some friendly engagements with the Chief of the Wahabees . . ."

The Treaty of Tilsit upset the calculations regarding the proposed mission to Persia. The friendship between the French Emperor and the Tsar ruled out the possibility of an Anglo-Russian alliance against France. Sir Harford Jones' proposed visit to St. Petersburg was now cancelled and after considerable delay he sailed for Bombay by the Cape route on 27th October, 1807. From Bombay Sir Harford was to proceed to Bushire in the Gulf of Persia.

Meanwhile in July 1807, Lord Minto took charge of the office of the Governor-General in Calcutta. He was aware of the decision of the Cabinet to send an Imperial envoy to Persia and he had opposed the selection of Harford Jones on the ground that Malcolm was the most suitable choice. The extravagance of Malcolm's last

mission stood in the way of his selection. After Minto's arrival in India the international situation underwent a great change on account of the Treaty of Tilsit. The Governor-General began to doubt whether in the altered circumstances the Imperial envoy would be able to proceed to Persia.

Soon after his arrival in India Lord Minto became aware of the increasing menace of France to Britain's Eastern possessions. On October 11, 1807, he wrote to Col. Barry Close: "Many circumstances denote very conclusively the extension of the enemies' views to this country. There is already a very active French diplomacy in Persia, which, after establishing an actual connection with that kingdom on the subversion of our influence there, is seeking, we know, with great diligence the means of extending its intrigues to the Durbars of Hindustan."¹

In January, 1808, news of General Gardane's imposing mission to Tehran reached Calcutta. It was also rumoured that a French army of 12,000 men under General Menon was marching towards Persia.² Napoleon's project of invading India seemed well on its way towards fulfilment. Minto became convinced of "the advanced nature of French intrigue in Persia and Turkey." But he believed that if the English "possessed the means of impressing the Persian Government with a just sense of the evils of such a connection, followed as it must manifestly and inevitably be by a fatal dependence on France, and of the injuries to which it must be exposed by placing itself in a state of hostility towards the British Government, considerations of national interest would induce the King of Persia to reject the alliance, which under the influence of illusive benefits he had been lately disposed to cultivate."³

The Governor-General decided that the proper way of impressing upon the Persian Government the evils of their connection with France was to despatch a mission to the Persian Gulf and the Turkish dominions in Arabia. Accordingly Lt.-Col. Malcolm was appointed to act as "envoy to the Governor-General, to the Court

1. Lord Minto in India, pp. 51-52.

2. Bengal Secret Letters, Vol. X, pp. 278-289.

3. Lord Minto's Minute, quoted in Letter of 9th February, 1808. Bengal Secret Letters, Vol. X, pp. 276-277.

of Persia and the Pasha of Baghdad." It was desirable to confer upon Malcolm a rank equal to that of General Gardane. By the exercise of his extraordinary powers Lord Minto conferred on Malcolm the temporary and local rank of Brigadier-General to be enjoyed only in the countries to which his mission had relation.¹ Minto had a very high opinion of his nominee. "By Col. Malcolm, if by any man living, we may hope to detach Persia from her hostile alliance with our enemy."²

It was, however, apprehended that Sir Harford Jones might have already arrived in Persia. In case of this contingency having taken place, Malcolm was instructed to "withhold his own credentials and diplomatic powers in Persia," and assume the character of Political Agent to the Governor-General. In this capacity he was expected to furnish valuable aid to the King's envoy.³ The object of Malcolm's mission was⁴:

1. "To acquire various specific points of intelligence, and to obtain authentic information, a knowledge of which would necessarily regulate the nature and extent of British measures and proceedings ;

2. "To engage on the part of the British Government to furnish military aid to Persia, if the Government of that country was found disposed, or could be induced to co-operate in the exclusion or expulsion of the French."

If Malcolm failed in gaining a Persian alliance against France, he was instructed to secure the neutrality of Persia. The French occupation of any port was to be resisted by force. Malcolm was supplied with a regular escort of 150 men and, to avoid suspicion, 300 men of the 84th Regiment were to accompany him as Marines, to be used as soldiers if need arose. A month later European Artillery with 2 six-pounders were to follow on board a battleship.⁵ The possibility of using force in Persia was clearly visualised.

Malcolm left Bombay on the 17th of April, 1808, and arrived at Bushire on the 10th of May. On the 19th he sent off Captain Pasley and Mr. Bruce with letters to the Shah of Persia and his

1. Bengal Secret Letters, Vol. X, pp. 330-331. Letter dated 31st March, 1808.

2. Minto to Dundas—Lord Minto in India, 108.

3. Lord Minto in India, pp. 108-9.

4. Bengal Secret Letters, Vol. X, Letter dated 31st March, 1808. pp. 342-346.

5. Bengal Secret Letters, Vol. X, p. 346. Kaye's Malcolm, Vol. I, p. 412.

ministers and himself waited at Bushire for a royal invitation to Tehran. On the eve of his departure from Bombay he had written to Lord Minto: "I mean to withhold my mission to the Court of Persia till such concessions are made as I conceive from the state of circumstances I have a right to demand; and my language, instead of solicitation, will be that of temperate remonstrance and offended friendship.¹ When he arrived in Persia there was nothing temperate or friendly about his tone and measures. The letter to the Chief Minister contained threatening expressions and aimed at bullying the Persian Court.² Captain Pasley was to demand, as a preliminary to Malcolm's advance, the dismissal of the French Mission. If this was not conceded, Pasley was to threaten strong measures and return to Bushire. Malcolm expected to succeed with the display of strength and firmness and waited confidently for a favourable reply.

There was an unpleasant surprise in store for the General. Captain Pasley was detained at Shiraz and forbidden to proceed any further. Malcolm was told to negotiate with Prince Hussain Ali Mirza, Governor of Farz, at the provincial capital of Shiraz. The British mission was refused permission to proceed to Tehran. The Shah had conceded the demand of General Gardane and Baron de Wrede, a representative of the Russian Government. Gardane had threatened to retire, if Malcolm was allowed to send even a courier to Tehran; and the Shah could not afford to throw away the support of the French, who were making very attractive promises.³

While referring Malcolm to Shiraz, the Shah gave his reason as administrative convenience and quoted the precedent of the Russian negotiations with Prince Abbas Mirza at Tiflis. But Malcolm considered it a great insult to be referred to a provincial governor, while his rival the French envoy was in direct communication with the Shah. He was furious and resolved to quit Persia immediately, much to the consternation of the merchants of Bushire, who feared

1. Kaye's *Malcolm I*: Malcolm to Minto, 15th April, 1808.

2. *Bengal Secret Letters*, Vol. X, pp. 119-125. Letter of 17th September, 1808.

3. *Mission du General Gardane*, pp. 172-178.

loss of trade through the vengeance of the English.¹ He embarked on 12th June, leaving Captain Pasley in charge of British affairs in Persia. On his return voyage Malcolm thought of the desirability of seizing the island of Kharrak, which was situated within 33 miles of Bushire.²

Malcolm's second mission to Persia failed utterly. The failure was partly due to General Gardane's influence at Tehran and the expectation of French help entertained by the Persian Court. But much blame rests upon Malcolm himself, who committed a grave error of judgment in trying to bully the Persians. In a memorandum of July 21, 1808, Lord Minto wrote: "The grand and ultimate purpose of the mission to Persia was to withdraw that court from its new and dangerous connection with France. Malcolm's peremptory demand for the expulsion of the French mission had left no room for consideration. The demand cannot be supported on any ground of justice." Indeed the Shah could never agree to Malcolm's demand. The expulsion of the French mission would have brought upon him the wrath of France in addition to what he was already suffering from Russian attacks. And he was required to run the risk of all this for the sake of very doubtful support from the English. The situation was delicate and required tact and patience. Malcolm, on the other hand, showed abruptness and failed to grasp the essentials. To a large extent he had himself brought the ignominious end of his own mission and the Governor-General and his Council were justified in expressing great disappointment at his hasty proceedings. But such was the strength of Malcolm's personality that soon after his arrival in Calcutta his views regarding the future measures of the Company towards Persia were accepted by the Government.

These views were expressed in a long Memorandum submitted to the Governor-General.³ The Memorandum was followed by a Report⁴ in which an elaborate scheme was presented. The scheme

-
1. Malcolm's Journal—Entry 11th June, 1808. Kaye's Malcolm I, p. 420.
 2. Letter to his wife, 8th July, 1808. Kaye's Malcolm, Vol. I, pp. 424—425.
 3. Bengal Secret Letters, Vol. X, Part II, pp. 196—220. Letter of 17th September, 1808.
 4. Home Miscellaneous Series No. 737, p. 341, Malcolm's Report, 6th October, 1810.

aimed at the intimidation of Persia and the safeguarding of British interests in the Persian Gulf. Malcolm held that the Indian Government required an activity and decision in their councils at least equal to that displayed by their enemies, and in this spirit of aggression he advocated certain measures which he described as "not only expedient but indispensable to the permanent security of national interests." Persia had committed two crimes:

(1) Its Government, which Malcolm described as "faithless and impotent, venal and false," did not have proper respect for the great and powerful Indian Government. The French had spread false rumours to the effect that England had been "reduced in Europe to the lowest degree of distress, and it was vain to expect support from a nation fighting for its own existence." The prestige of the Indian Government needed to be emphasised by a practical demonstration of force.

(2) The Persians had received French influence in various forms. French diplomats dominated the counsels of Tehran. French officers trained Persian armies and French technicians worked at important jobs. The French influence in Persia must be met boldly and the English must, if need be, anticipate their enemies by an aggressive stroke on their part.

To eradicate these two defects from Persia, Malcolm continued, diplomacy was of no use. The use of force alone would impress upon the Persians the might of the East India Company and secure her from the danger of French invasion. The remedy was the occupation of an advanced position in the Persian Gulf, from which the Company could "negotiate with dignity or undertake military operations with effect." Such an advanced position was the island of Kharrak, which should be occupied for its great strategic importance. The possession of Kharrak would "enable us to carry on negotiations and military operations with honour and security to any extent we desired, whereas, without it, we must continue at the mercy of the fluctuating policy of unsteady, impotent and faithless courts, adopting expensive and useless measures of defence at every uncertain alarm, and being ultimately obliged either to abandon the scene altogether, or, when danger actually came, to incur the most deliberate hazard of complete failure by sending a military expedition which must trust for its subsistence and safety to states who

were known, not only from the individual character of their rulers, but from their actual condition and character, to be undeserving of a moment's confidence." Malcolm described his proposal as "moderate" and "grounded upon principles of the strictest defensive policy. . . of a nature that could not be mistaken" and he felt sure that the Persians would gratefully and increasingly appreciate British connection. If, however, treachery and impertinence continued to sway the counsels of Tehran, the Shah could be frightened into a correct policy by a civil war in Persia. Nudjiff Ali, a pretender of the Zund dynasty was at Bombay and receiving a pension of Rs. 400 per mensem from the British Government.¹ Nasrullah Khan, the chief minister of the provincial government of Fars favoured British connection; and so did the merchant population of Persia. In spite of French propaganda, Malcolm believed that many Persians among the higher classes wished the English well. All these favourable elements could be mobilised to coerce the Persian Court, should an emergency arise.

Such were the views expressed with characteristic force and conviction by Malcolm in his memorandum and Report. His argument won the day at Calcutta. The Board accepted the general principles of policy recommended by him.² Malcolm received the complete confidence of the Indian Government and was naturally chosen to put this policy into practical effect.³

On 29th August, 1808, the Governor-General and Council decided to send Malcolm on his martial expedition to the Persian Gulf. A military force was organised and effectively equipped for the occupation of Kharrak. Official circles in Calcutta enthusiastically accepted Malcolm's bellicose schemes. The Brigadier-General wrote to his wife: "You know how full of doubt my mind was with regard to the view which Lord Minto would take of affairs in Persia. These have all been dispelled, and I depart on a second mission to that country, armed with all the powers, military and political, that I could desire, and honoured by a confidence which appears unbounded."⁴ Malcolm had not been long on the sea from Calcutta when he received very disappointing news from Lord Minto. Sir

1. Bengal Secret Letters, Vol. X, Part II, p. 209.

2. Bengal Secret Letters, Vol. X, Part II, pp. 220-21.

3. Idem. pp. 224 and 227.

4. Kaye, Vol. I, p. 435.

Harford Jones had already left for Persia on his mission of peace and friendship to the Court of Persia. "Sir Harford Jones will probably be at Shiraz before anything from hence can reach him ; but I doubt very much the power of controlling him from Bengal, although I certainly possess the right to do so, and shall assert it."¹ This news was a blow to Malcolm. "I cannot tell you the agitation of my mind on this occasion. I have had the cup dashed from my lips, and plans which promised to make me the fortunate instrument of my country's success, are now delayed, if not altogether defeated. I cannot tell you Lord Minto's distress." The disappointed Malcolm returned to Calcutta and for the time being the hope of acquiring Kharrak receded in the distance. But Lord Minto did not forget his right of controlling the King's envoy to Persia and he was soon to assert it in a manner which showed the pretensions to sovereign power of the Company's Government at Calcutta.

Seven days² after Malcolm had left Bombay for Persia on his second mission, the King's envoy Sir Harford Jones landed at that port on the 24th April, 1808, after a voyage from England which had taken exactly six months. Jones was somewhat annoyed at Malcolm's departure. "It seems the arrival of the Sapphire was hourly expected at the time General Malcolm left for Bombay and therefore I cannot but lament he shall have departed so hastily—indeed it appears to me that the spirit of the 9th para³ of the instructions he received from His Excellency the Governor-General does not altogether justify a procedure which the General could not but be aware would throw His Majesty's mission on its arrival at Bombay into a very novel, delicate and unexpected situation."⁴ Jones decided to stay in India to await the wishes of the Governor-General and the orders of His Majesty's Government. But he expressed

1. Minto to Malcolm, Barrackpore, 30th Sept. 1808.

2. The date of the arrival at Bombay of H. M. S. Sapphire is given as 24th April in Sir Harford Jones' despatch to the Foreign Secretary. In the account of his mission to Persia published many years later the date is given as 26th April. There are many inaccurate dates in this book, which contains hardly any useful information about the diplomatic relations with Persia.

3. 9th paragraph of General Malcolm's instructions : "You will be furnished with credentials as envoy, or ambassador, from myself to the Court of Persia and to the Pascha of Baghdad to be presented in the ever expedient to repair in person to those places, and in Sir Harford Jones nor any other person accredited by His Majesty in Persia."

4. Bombay 30th April, 1808. Jones to the Rt. Hon'ble George Canning.

to Lord Minto the futility of sending missions from Calcutta. "Since the French have appeared at Tehran, the Persians are aware that national ministers can only be accredited by His Majesty."¹ Soon after he received Lord Minto's letter informing him of the change of Malcolm's commission as envoy to Persia to envoy to the court of Baghdad, and in charge of diplomatic relations with countries west of Persia. This change was to be effected if Sir Harford Jones went to Persia and Lord Minto took it for granted that he would do so.² But Sir Harford replied that his immediate departure would serve no useful purpose and the supersession of Malcolm would produce a bad impression in Tehran.³ He resolved to stay on and wait for the results of Malcolm's mission. For this wise decision to remain in India Lord Minto praised the public spirit of the King's envoy.⁴

During the period of waiting which followed Sir Harford Jones read all the correspondence relating to Persia supplied by the Governor of Bombay and the latest reports from Persia. In spite of rumours of a treaty between France and Persia, Sir Harford was optimistic about British chances in Persia and thought that the Shah's reception of French Missions was intended to stir the British to renewed friendship and active assistance. "Our prospects in Persia are certainly satisfactory and indeed in all the country correspondence, I have yet read, I see no very manifest proofs of intimate connection between the Frenchmen now in Persia and the Persian Government, except it be that one Frenchman has drawn from the prince 2,000 piastres for his travelling charges, on which account it is very well worth remarking the reporter thinks the Frenchman has acted like 'a great Jew.'⁵ Soon, however, this optimism disappeared on the receipt of reports about General Malcolm's mission to Persia. When news of Malcolm's indignant withdrawal from Bushire arrived, the situation looked alarming indeed. "The aspect of our affairs in Persia is highly unfavourable and no very strong hope can reasonably be entertained of its becoming more satisfactory. The difficulties I have to struggle against are most formidable and unless I shall be fortunate enough to be aided by some occurrence which shall act

1. Bombay, 28th April, 1808, Jones to Minto.

2. Secret Department, Fort William 21st April, 1808. From Minto to Jones.

3. P. Jones to Lord Minto.

4. Minto to Jones, 6th June, 1808.

5. to Rt. Hon'ble G. Canning.

strongly in our favour in the general politics of Europe, I must confess I conceive them to be almost insurmountable."¹

On August 12, 1808, Lord Minto authorised Jones "to proceed to Persia, without delay of a reference to us, on the receipt of the intelligence of General Malcolm's having left Persia in consequence of the result of those discussions upon which his continuance or departure appeared to turn at the date of his latest dispatches then in our possessions."² Jones had already learnt direct from Bushire that Malcolm had left for India and on receipt of Lord Minto's letter he resolved to make use of this *carte blanche*. Malcolm was shortly expected at Calcutta and Jones could have waited a few days longer to hear further instructions from the Governor-General. But he chose to act on the authority of Lord Minto's letter which he received on 4th September and announced his decision to proceed to Persia on 11th September. He actually left on 12th September, just missing Lord Minto's letter of 22nd August which reached Bombay on 14th September. This letter was written after Lord Minto's consultations with Malcolm and it required Sir Harford Jones to remain at Bombay.

There is some obscurity regarding Sir Harford Jones' motive in leaving for Persia rather hastily and abruptly. He had written to Lord Minto on August 20th asking for the Governor-General's instructions on his mission and saying that he (Jones) was not competent to decide without reference to the Indian Government the line of policy to be pursued in Persia. "I shall not leave this place for the Gulf of Persia before I receive your Excellency's commands in reply to this letter." Writing to Captain Pasley on 2nd September he had expressed doubts regarding the expediency of his mission to Persia in the light of the Shah's attitude towards Malcolm and had announced his intention to await Lord Minto's instructions.³ On receiving Lord Minto's letter giving him *carte blanche* he decided to leave after a week without waiting for a reply to his letter of the 20th August. Perhaps Jones feared cancellation or further postponement of his mission through Malcolm's influence at Calcutta and left abruptly to dodge that possibility. It is impossible to know

1. "The Times," 3, 1808. Jones to Canning.

2. "The Times," Vol. X, Part II, p. 352.

3. "The Times," Vol. X, Part II, p. 350-51. Letter 15th December, 1808.

the truth. Sir Harford Jones was certainly justified in leaving for Persia after receiving Minto's letter on 4th September, which clearly required him to go.

Whatever the motive of his hasty departure, his arrival in Persia took place at very favourable time. Deeply involved in the Spanish adventure and in many continental entanglements, Napoleon had lost interest in Persia and had neglected his mission to Tehran. General Gardane had promised extravagantly and he could not fulfil even a part of his promises. Russian aggression continued on the Persian Frontier. Negotiations with Russia failed completely in spite of the good offices of the French. There was growing estrangement between General Gardane and the Court of Persia.¹

Disappointed at the attitude of the French the Shah turned to the English. A Mehmandar was appointed to conduct Sir Harford Jones from Bushire to Shiraz. The Prince of Shiraz gave him a magnificent public reception on New Year's Day. During the festivities at Shiraz Jones received a letter from Lord Minto, directing him to return to India immediately and informing him of the Indian Government's policy towards Persia. Objection was taken to Jones' conciliatory policy and he was required to inform the Persian Government of the Governor-General's intention to occupy the Island of Kharrak and to explain that the expedition was purely "defensive and pacific."²

Jones resolved to disobey Lord Minto's directions. Indeed he had no other choice before him. It appeared that his conciliatory policy had good chance of establishing English influence at Tehran. It was too good an opportunity to be thrown away. He also hoped that Minto would change his mind on the receipt of the latest information of the diplomatic situation in Persia. Moreover an imperial Mehmandar had arrived to conduct him to the Shah and it was too late to withdraw now. Jones informed the ministers at Shiraz of the contents of Lord Minto's dispatch and won their confidence by giving a written bond under which he stood surety with his life and property for the safety of Kharrak. Somewhat rashly he made other promises without reference to the Indian Government³ and squandered presents liberally to enhance his reputation. Promises and

1. Mission du General Gardane pp. 180-90.

2. Bengal Secret Letters, Vol. XI, p. 327.

3. Bengal Secret Letters, Vol. XI, p. 51.

presents paved the envoy's way to the presence of "the King of Kings" and "the Asylum of the Universe." On 14th February he arrived at Tehran and heard the welcome news that General Gardane had already withdrawn from the capital the day before. On the 17th the Shah received him in public audience and appreciated the gift of the famous Hornby diamond and many other presents from the English envoy. Many nights of conferences between the English envoy and the Shah's ministers followed. After considerable discussions terms of a preliminary treaty were agreed upon.

The preliminary treaty of friendship and defensive alliance was signed on the 12th March and exchanged on the 15th March, 1803. Sir Harford Jones assumed his own responsibility on account of the distance and delay in communicating to India or England. The articles of the preliminary treaty were intended as a basis for a definite Treaty. Article 3 of the preliminary treaty ran as follows :

" His Majesty the King of Persia judges it necessary to declare that from the date of these preliminary articles every treaty or agreement he may have made with any one of the Powers of Europe becomes null and void and that he will not permit any European force whatever to pass through Persia, either towards India or towards the ports of that country."

By this Article the English got all that they wished for in Persia. Persia chose to come into the sphere of British influence. In return the British conceded certain things mentioned in articles 4 and 5, which read as follows :—

ARTICLE 4.

In case any European forces have invaded or shall invade the territories of His Majesty the King of Persia, His Britannic Majesty will afford to His Majesty the King of Persia a force, or in lieu of it, a subsidy, with warlike ammunition, such as guns, muskets, &c., and officers to the amount that may be to the advantage of both parties, for the expulsion of the force so invading, and the number of these forces, or the amount of the subsidy, ammunition, &c., shall be hereafter regulated in the definitive treaty. In case His Majesty the King of England should make peace with such European power, His Britannic Majesty shall use his utmost endeavours to negotiate

and procure a peace between his Persian Majesty and such power. But if, which God forbid, His Britannic Majesty's efforts for this purpose should fail of success, then the forces or subsidy, according to the amount mentioned in the definitive Treaty, shall still continue in the service of the King of Persia as long as the said European forces shall remain in the territories of His Persian Majesty, or until peace is concluded between His Persian Majesty and the said European power. And it is further agreed that in case the dominions of His Britannic Majesty in India are attacked or invaded by the Afghans or any other power, His Majesty the King of Persia shall afford a force for the protection of the said dominions according to the stipulations contained in the definitive Treaty.

ARTICLE 5.

If a detachment of British troops has arrived from India in the Gulf of Persia, and by the consent of His Persian Majesty landed on the Island of Garrack, or at any of the Persian ports, they shall not in any manner possess themselves of such places, and from the date of these preliminary Articles the said detachment shall be at the disposal of His Majesty the King of Persia, the amount of which shall be settled in the definitive Treaty.

By another provision "the British Government promised neutrality or friendly mediation at the desire of both parties in case of war between Persia and Afghanistan (Article 7). The Treaty was signed by Mirza Mohammed Sheffea and Mohammad Hussain, who had been given full powers to negotiate under a *firman* of the Persian King, and by Sir Harford Jones.¹

On the night of April 3, 1809, Sir Harford Jones was able, after great difficulty, to procure from the Persian plenipotentiaries permission to copy the political and commercial Treaties concluded between Persia and France in 1807.² The political Treaty was sent, ratified by Napoleon, to the King of Persia.³ The commercial Treaty was negotiated and concluded between General Gardanne and the Persian Government at Tehran. From a perusal of the political Treaty it seems that at the date of its signing (7th May, 1807) Napoleon had not planned any attack on the British possessions in

1. Bombay 2nd June, 1808. Jones to Rt. Hon'ble G. Canning.

2. Bombay 8th Sept., 1808. Jones to Canning.

3. Bengal Secret Letters. Vol. X. Part II. p. 352.

India by the route of Persia. Such a measure as a distant possibility might have occurred to the mind of the Emperor. It is true that Sir Harford Jones wrote to the Foreign Secretary: "Mirza Shaffea in the course of some of our late conferences, mentioned it had been agreed, that not more than 5,000 French Troops should be admitted into Persia; and that a body of Russian Troops should be transported to the Eastern shore of the Caspian to march from thence to the route of Caboul into the Northern part of India. It seems to me evident that the Chief of the French Government principally depended for his proposed attack on India on the Persian and Russian Auxiliaries."¹ But the British envoy saw no documents and it was in the interest of the Persian ministers to exaggerate the French menace to British possession in the East in order to get a substantial subsidy from Great Britain. Moreover, at this stage Sir Harford was in difficulties with the Government of India and he was eager to justify his conduct with the King's Government. "Had my conduct here been less decisive and by that means the French legation had returned from Tabreze it would certainly have been chosen by this country, as the Mediator between Persia and Russia, which would have established that mission beyond the possibility of our ever removing it. The establishment of a French mission in Persia must always have disquieted us by its intrigues in India; and ultimately have occasioned such an invasion of that country as would at all events have called for the greatest expense of blood and treasure to oppose."²

The expulsion of the French mission from Tehran was achieved after considerable difficulty. The Persian Government was reluctant to break with France completely. The Persian King said that the French had done him no harm, they might mediate between Russia and Persia, the English had not rendered him armed assistance and the French were his guests. Sir Harford used all the arguments against the continuance of the French mission at Tehran. In addition to the political and military advantage of friendship with Britain, he pointed out that the trade between India and Persia was annually to the amount of 500 lakhs of rupees and it would be a

1. Tehran, 4th April, 1809. Jones to Canning. F. O. 60

2. Tehran, 4th April, 1809. Jones to Canning. F. O. 60
2

pity to interrupt this trade for the sake of keeping two Frenchmen at Tehran. The British envoy also stressed the fact that France was far away from Persia, was not a sea-power and could render no effective assistance to her ally in the Persian Gulf. After long delay the dismissal of the French mission was finally secured on 29th April, 1809.¹

Why did France fail to win a diplomatic victory in Persia? Sir Harford Jones attributed British success in Persia to his own personal efforts and to the impression of British wealth and arms which his mission had been able to produce in that country. Many arguments were used by the British and were patiently listened to by the Persians, but they did not really decide the issue. Nor did the frequent harping upon the irreligious nature and anti-Moslem character of the French Government by both Malcolm and Jones produce more than mere professions of horror on the part of the Persian ministers. In reality the French Government had in its power to mediate between Russia and Persia and thus establish French influence at Tehran. It is certain that the supreme concern of the Persian Government was neither the advantage of trade with India nor the use of British sea power; it was to put an end to the Russian invasion on an advantageous and honourable basis. After the Treaty of Tilsit the Emperor Napoleon could prevail upon the Tsar Alexander to concede satisfactory peace terms to Persia; and he would have done so had the grand design of the domination of both East and West possess any solid basis in fact. The differences between Russia and Persia were not so deep as to be incapable of solution by peaceful mediation; this indeed was the opinion of the British envoy. Before proceeding upon his duties he had laid down in a State Paper: "Let England once settle a peace between Persia and Russia, let her envoy conduct himself with common prudence and the downfall of French interests at Tehran must follow of course."² This was the essential feature of the foreign policy of Persia during these years. The fact that Napoleon did not make use of his opportunity in Persia after Tilsit shows that he had never seriously entertained the possibility of a

1. Tehran, 4th April, 1809. Jones to Canning. F. O. 60

2. Tehran, 2nd May, 1809. Jones to Canning, F. O. 60/2.

3. Vire Otrees, 7th January, 1807. Sir Harford Jones., F. O. 60/1.

French invasion of India through Persia and Afghanistan. If he dreamt of world domination, it was to be achieved by the invasion and conquest of England rather than by frittering away the resources of France in the plains of Central Asia. Napoleon was always the inveterate enemy of England and the diplomacy and military measures of the French Emperor were directed towards the overthrow of the Island of traders and sailors.¹ His early experiences in the East had taught him that the best way of driving England out of the Orient was to paralyse her at home and to this purpose he gave his thought and energy. The murder of Czar Paul, the break-down of the League of Armed Neutrality, the failure of Villeneuve, the arming of Austria, and the battle of Trafalgar led him to change his plans. Direct invasion of England was no longer possible; the method of blockade required his predominance over all Europe; and in making this predominance effective he met his ruin.

The contrast between the British and French missions in Persia is striking. While the British missions during these years were impressive in scale, well-organised, regular and dependent upon the power of the East India Company with its network of commercial and political outposts in Asia, the French missions were spasmodic, ill-organised, semi-official, and often manned by adventurers. While Sir Harford Jones was cementing Anglo-Persian friendship assiduously, the French agent at Tehran was haggling about monetary claims against the Persian Government.²

After the dismissal of the French mission British diplomacy in Persia took a sudden turn. The change was due to the developments in the European situation. So far the object of the mission had been to counteract French intrigue in Persia and to safeguard Britain's interests in the East. Sir Harford had, in the earlier course of the mission, suggested mediation between Russia and Persia, the achievement of which would establish British influence at Tehran.³ The Russians were now inclined to come to terms with Persia in a way not

-
1. Harold C. Deutsch: *The Genesis of Napoleonic Imperialism*, H. U. P. 1938.
 2. Tehran, 19th April 1809. Jones to Minto. Copy of correspondence with French Charge d' Affaires. F.O. 60/2.
 3. Tiflis, 24th March 1809. Letter from H. E. General Gudovitch to H. E. Mirza Bozurg.

very unfavourable to the latter.¹ The Persian ministers were anxious to conclude a Treaty of Quadruple Alliance between Russia, Turkey, Britain and Persia, a proposal which found no encouragement from Sir Harford Jones.² Russia and Turkey were at war with each other and the British policy at Tehran was to let the war continue so that Russia's diversion in the East could relieve the pressure of her arms on Turkey. Sir Harford wrote to Lord Minto: "Peace between Persia and Russia at this moment would be a lamentable mischief both to ourselves and to our allies. It is my duty, notwithstanding all that has happened, to make some effort to prevent this Court forming an engagement of peace with Russia."³ This change of policy was suggested by Mr. Adair, His Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, and the ultimate object was "to divert the forces of Russia from the Austrian territory by finding them employment on the lower Danube and on their own frontier."⁴ The British envoy exerted himself to the utmost in goading Persia on to a greater offensive against Russia. Sir Harford told the Persian ministers that Georgia could be recovered and Russian armies beaten off; he encouraged a treaty between Persia and Turkey. "I have endeavoured with these people," wrote Sir Harford, "to place the war the Porte has entered into with Russia in the light of a war of religion and I have succeeded in convincing them, if any accident happens to the Ottoman Porte the downfall of the Mohemetan religion inevitably follows."⁵ Such was the diplomatic success of the English in Persia that the French agents in the East felt quite dejected. From Baghdad General Gardanne wrote to his government about English intrigues in Turkey and in the Persian Gulf and begged for more money "to keep pace with the sums expended by the English to bribe the persons in power."⁶ The English had a strong party at the Persian Court, at the head of which were the Prince Royal and Mirza Bozurg. Jones had much influence over the Persian King. It was a remarkable achievement, indeed, to persuade Persia to continue the war, which brought her no advantage and a good deal of expense. Russia offered to compensate

1. Tehran, 4th May, 1809. Jones to Canning.

2. Tehran, 18th May, 1809. Jones to Minto

3. Pera, 29th March, 1809. Adair to Jones.

4. Tehran, 20th May, 1809. Jones to Robert Adair. (In cypher).

5. Baghdad, 3rd May, 1809. General

6. Royal Camp near Tebreze, 17th Au

Minto.

Persia at the expense of Turkish dominions.¹ The Russian Commander-in-Chief in Georgia offered good terms of peace.² All this was rejected by the Persian Court, which decided to remain loyal to friendship with Britain and sympathy for Turkey. The military circles at Tehran became too confident of a Persian victory. The remaining vestiges of the French Legation were expelled from Tauris on September 12, 1809, and with this the French influence in Persia disappeared completely.³

Sir Harford Jones met with difficulties resulting from the failure of the Indian Government to send a subsidy to Persia. The Governor-General was frankly hostile and the Governor of Bombay in consequence of the Governor-General's orders in the preceding January thought himself unauthorised to incur any further expense on account of the mission.⁴ The attitude of the Government of India created an alarming situation for the English embassy.

General Termassof and the Prince Royal proposed an armistice between Russia and Persia. The Persian Government showed eagerness for peace, because Mustafa Khan of Talisk and some tribes on the south-west side of the Caspian had broken into rebellion.⁵ At a conference with Mirza Sheffea and Mirza Bozurg, Sir Harford Jones emphasised that Britain would not object to peace between Russia and Persia, provided it was based on the condition that the alliance between France and Persia would never be renewed and no foreign troops of any description would be permitted to march through Persia towards India. The Persian king assured Sir Harford that the articles proposed by the British and the complete and entire cession of Georgia, were the only bases on which he could ever consent to conclude a treaty with Russia.⁶ Sir Harford believed in the assurances of the Persian Government, but at the same time he feared the possibility of French influence in favour of Persia compelling Russia to relinquish Georgia. "Should the Russian Emperor carry his submission to the views of the French

1. Royal Camp near Tebreze, 17th August, 1809. Jones to Minto.

2. Tebreze, Letter from the Russian Commander-in-Chief in Georgia to the Prince Royal.

3. Tauris, 12th September, 1809. Jones to Canning.

4. 5th June, 1809. Governor of Bombay to Jones. Received at Tebreze on 17th September, 1809.

5. Tebreze, 21st September, 1809. Jones to Minto. No. 28.

6. *Ibid.* 7.

Government to this extent," wrote the Ambassador, "there can be no doubt that the same power will direct him to tack to the cession of Georgia the renunciation by Persia of her lately concluded alliance with us, and possibly if affairs in Europe take an evil turn the renewal of the project for the invasion of India."¹ This fear was constantly present in the minds of the English diplomats.

Supplies from the East India Company failed to arrive in spite of Sir Harford's repeated remonstrances addressed to the Governor-General and complaints to the Foreign Secretary. In the meantime the negotiations during the armistice, which were carried on in a spirit of deception on both sides, came to an end. Persia insisted on a Quadruple Alliance between England, Russia, Persia and Turkey. Russia refused and hostilities again broke out.² Soon after this a French agent M. Jouannins arrived at Tabris. The arrival of the Frenchman alarmed the English envoy, who saw in it another proof of Napoleon's design on India. Sir Harford Jones secured the dismissal of the French agent by agreeing to advance six months' subsidy to Persia.³ Informing the Chairman and Secret Committee of the East India Company about his arrangements regarding the collection of the subsidy, Sir Harford wrote: "If in the state the world is now unhappily thrown into, the intimate and firm alliance with Persia, which under the divine favour it has been my lot to form, is neglected or abandoned, or if a French mission is suffered again to get footing in this country, from that day your possessions in India will be subject to alarm, confusion and ultimately to invasion."⁴

Throughout the year 1810 fighting between Persia and Russia continued. All moves towards peace between the two countries were effectively defeated by the English Envoy. Under the masterly direction of Foreign Secretary Canning the grand objective of defeating Napoleon was being carried out in numerous details of diplomacy spread over Europe and beyond. By continuing their struggle against Russia and thus relieving Turkey in Europe, the Persian

-
1. Letter from Prince Royal Abbas Mirza to Gen. Termassof at Tauris. Jones to Minto, No. 30. Letter from Mirza Sheffea enclosed.
 2. Letter from Prince Royal Abbas Mirza to Gen. Termasof at Tauris. Jones to Minto. No. 30. Letter from Mirza Sheffea enclosed.
 3. Tauris, 10th, Dec. 1809. Jones to Minto, No. 35.
 4. Tauris, 14th December, 1809. Jones to Canning No. 25.

Government took part unconsciously in the great conflict between Britain and Napoleon. This aspect of the work of the King's Envoy in Persia during the years 1809 and 1810 has never been mentioned in any account of Anglo-Persian relations during these years. Yet it is very significant and throws some new light on the well-known clash between Sir Harford Jones and Lord Minto. While the Governor-General imagined that the sole function of the King's Envoy at Tehran was to promote the interests of the East India Company and his foremost duty was to act under the instructions of the Indian Government, Sir Harford Jones found himself one of the agents of the British Foreign Office, which at this time was functioning vigorously under the inspired leadership of Canning. To the controversy between the King's Envoy and the Indian Government we must now turn our attention.

Reference has already been made to Malcolm's militant plans for the Persian Gulf and his success in convincing the Indian Government to his point of view. At Calcutta and Bombay preparations were going on for his proposed expedition of Kharrak. It was in consequence of these preparations that Sir Harford had thought fit to disobey the orders of his recall and he had pushed on to Tehran. The disobedience of the King's Envoy produced resentment in Calcutta. On 30th January, 1809, Lord Minto wrote a letter to Jones, in which the Governor-General announced the dissolution of the King's mission. Sir Harford received this letter soon after the signing of the preliminary Treaty. If Jones refused to withdraw from Persia, the Bills he had given to merchants were to be dishonoured. In this awkward situation the envoy tided over the financial crisis by his personal influence over the merchants. The King of Persia, who felt quite baffled at Minto's action, desired more illumination on the British constitution. Jones explained the position by comparing the King's Government in London to the Shah, himself to an ambassador sent by the Shah to Constantinople, and Lord Minto to a "Beglerbeg" or provincial governor who tried to interfere by pitting his own envoy against the King's ambassador. These comparisons clarified the constitutional position to the Shah, but, as Jones remarked, he thus committed his "scarlet sin, never forgiven, nor ever forgotten, in a certain place." The Indian

Government felt deep humiliation at the comparison of the Governor-General with a Persian "beglerbeg."

The Shah of Persia, however, knew how to deal with a disobedient beglerbeg and he was not going to keep in the dark his royal brother King George III about the anarchic state of affairs existing in his eastern possessions. Mirza Abdul Hassan who had been appointed as the Persian Vakeel¹ (Charge d' Affaires) to the Court of London, was to deliver a letter from the Shah to George III. After profuse expressions of courtesy the Persian King referred in his letter to the steps taken by the Government of India against Sir Harford Jones: "We instantly perceived that if hitherto some matters of friendship had remained unattended, it was from the insufficiency of powers to perform them in the Government of India. At the moment these things were concluded the aforesaid ambassador (Jones) received and communicated to our ministry most unprofitable letters from the Governor-General of India suspending and dissolving by his authority the functions of the aforesaid ambassador and announcing a determination not to execute any engagements he might have contracted. Most Royal and illustrious Brother at such a proceeding we became lost in astonishment and we cannot yet conceive how the Governor-General could act in such direct opposition to the terms of your royal letter and your magnificent full powers.² No doubt Futhe Ali Shah expected that George III would cut off Lord Minto's head for his mutinous conduct. Mirza Abdul Hassan was also charged with a letter from the minister Mirza Sheffea addressed to Canning. The object of this letter was "to wipe the dust of astonishment from the looking glass of friendship." After stating this object the letter went on to review the course of events and pleaded for increased assistance in money and war-material. Referring to Lord Minto's conduct the minister wrote: "Now after everything had been thus happily settled, the ambassador received a letter from the Governor-General of India acquainting him that the Governor-General had suspended his functions and dissolved his mission. At such a proceeding it is impossible for me to express to

1. Tehran, 23rd April, 1809. Jones to Canning F.O. 60-2.

2. Letter to the King's Most Excellent Majesty (in charge of Mirza Abdul Hassan) from H. M. Futhe Ali Shah, King of Persia).

your Excellency the astonishment and grief with which I was seized, nor can I now make out in what manner the Governor-General can dismiss a person nominated by the King. It is difficult for me to imagine how this can possibly have happened . . . I must conclude your Excellency will agree with me that the conduct of the Governor-General is not suitable to the dignity of your Government and that the rumour of it will be disadvantageous to its reputation."¹ To Sir Harford Jones the King wrote as follows : " Notwithstanding the letter from the Governor-General dissolving your powers we shall abide by the alliance formed and shall not permit you to depart. As the relation of this transaction would reflect the darkest disgrace on the English Nation, we shall not publish it . . . Conformable to this our august command, retain your exalted situation, remain near our person, send the respectable Mr. Morier to relate the tenor of the past transactions to the ministers of your state, and await the determination of their orders."²

But there were still more surprises in store for the Persian Court. While Minto's letter was forgotten at Tehran and explained off as a temporary lapse, the controversy between the King's envoy and the Indian Government reopened with a dramatic suddenness towards the end of the year.

On 31st December, 1809, Haji Mohammad Hussain Khan informed Sir Harford Jones about the arrival of Captain Pasley at Bushire with the orders of the Governor-General dismissing the King's envoy.³ The news of Jones' dismissal by Lord Minto produced bewilderment among Tehran's official circles. Captain Pasley delivered the following message from the Governor-General to the Court of Persia : " The Ambassador from the powerful state of England to the Court of Persia, whoever he is, must be under my directions and orders ; the present ambassador having disobeyed my orders, I have dissolved his authority and mission."⁴ Having delivered Lord Minto's message, Pasley announced with a flourish :

-
1. Letter from H. E. Mirza Sheffea to Canning (per Mirza Abdul Hassan, Vakeel of H. M. the King of Persia, 1809. F.O. 60/2.
 2. Tehran 3rd May, 1809, Reply from the Persian King to Sir Harford Jones' Note of 24th April, 1809, F. O. 60-2.
 3. Letter from Haji Mohammad Hussain Khan to Sir H. Jones, 31st December, 1809. F. O. 60-3.
 4. Joint Letter from H. E. Mirza Mohammad Sheffea and Mirza Bozurg to H. Jones, 31st December, 1809.

"I, Pasley, am appointed to succeed him at the Persian Court, and I will fulfil all the engagements he has entered until an ambassador on the part of the Governor-General arrives at the Court of Tehran, for transacting the necessary business."¹

This unexpected line of action on the part of the Governor-General was diametrically opposed to all that the Persian ministers had understood of the British Constitution so far. They had thought that the King's Ambassador had come to negotiate on behalf of an authority which the Governor-General could not override. They had always shown reluctance to deal with the East India Company on terms of equality and they preferred to have an alliance between throne and throne. Here was an agent of the Company hurling defiance and contempt at the representative of the British throne and announcing his summary dismissal by the sweet will of the Governor-General.

In Tehran there was much speculation about this curious situation which had arisen in the affairs of the British nation. Had Lord Minto rebelled against George III? Was the Governor-General aiming at setting up an independent dynasty of English rulers in India? To many acquainted with the annals of the Orient such a contingency appeared to be very natural. Mirza Mohammad Sheffea and Mirza Bozurg were more cautious and thoughtful: "We can only comprehend the affair in this manner, that your letters and representations have arrived with His Majesty's Government, and that His Majesty has issued his commands to the Governor-General to execute your engagements and treaty, and that the Governor-General in order that nobody might say he was not able to do anything in Persia, has hit on this contrivance to appropriate to himself the merit of your treaty and to say that 'I will do so and so'—In short we are perfectly astonished and cannot comprehend what sort of an affair this is, and what these letters and declarations mean."²

Resentment followed astonishment. Mirza Bozurg wrote: "What confidence can be placed in past transactions? Since it does

1. Jones to Canning. Tauris, 2nd January, 1807.

2. Joint Letter from Mirza M. Sheffea and Mirza Bozurg to H. Jones, 31st December, 1809.

not seem your Government knows what is proper in its own affairs, and therefore is not likely to assist us in managing ours, what confidence can one place in any one who shall now come? It was extremely weak of us to withdraw ourselves from every other alliance, for the sake of allying ourselves to a Power that seems to have no regular manner of conducting its affairs."¹ With a good deal of force the Persian ministers brought home what seemed to them a glaring inconsistency in English diplomatic relations with Persia: "General Malcolm came and concluded a treaty, which, when we demanded the execution from the Governor-General, he answers he has no power to execute without the commission of the King and his ministers. You sign a treaty and the Governor-General, who declares he has no power in one instance, without the King, exerts, in the other, a power superior to the King, and not only dissolves the authority His Majesty gave you, but the mission altogether."²

Sir Harford Jones decided to disregard the proceedings of the Governor-General and continue as the King's minister in Tehran. To his subordinate Mr. Sheridan, he explained: "I will not retire from Persia, for many reasons, but principally for this, that by doing so, at this moment, I should proclaim to the Persians that the Governor-General is superior in power to the King; and this my Welsh blood will never suffer me to do."³ The Welsh blood, indeed, boiled up with just indignation at the treatment of the King's envoy by the Governor-General. On 1st January he addressed a long letter to Lord Minto, in which he complained bitterly against the attitude of the latter. He argued that no authority ever vested in the Governor-General to abrogate and annul the mission proceeding from the King.⁴ Indeed Lord Minto had himself admitted this contention when on the 23rd May, 1808, he had written to Sir Harford Jones: "It never was the intention of this Government to supersede the mission on which you have been deputed by His Majesty's ministers and the Hon'ble the Secret Committee; nor do I consider this Government to possess authority for that purpose."

1. Letter from Mirza Bozurg to H. Jones.

2. Letter from Jones to Minto, 1st January, 1810.

3. Sheridan's Journal, quoted from "An Account of His Majesty's Mission to the Court of Persia," 1807-11, by Sir Harford Jones Brydges, p. 128.

4. Jones to Minto. Tauris, 1st January, 1810.

Later many reasons induced Lord Minto to change this opinion. The most important reasons were the refusal of the Court of Persia to admit General Malcolm, the envoy of the Governor-General, to the presence, and the charge that Sir Harford Jones had published to the Persians the superiority and independence of the King's Government in respect to the East India Company and the Governor-General. Sir Harford quoted from Shakespeare to bring out vividly his discomforts proceeding from Lord Minto's effort to stop his means of subsistence. "General Gardanne has been disgraced by his Court for quitting Persia, and Your Excellency has attempted to disgrace me for procuring his expulsion."

The Persian King permitted Sir Harford Jones to continue as Envoy Extraordinary. Meanwhile reports of Malcolm's coming visit to Persia reached Tehran. Sir Harford told Lord Minto: "I do not wish to conceal from Your Excellency I have declared most explicitly to the Persian ministers, I cannot nor will not, in any shape act with Brigadier General Malcolm in this country—our ideas and sentiments on Persia are so essentially different that such a coalition can lead to nothing but confusion and distraction."¹

General Malcolm at last arrived at Bushire. Though the Governor-General expressed grave dissatisfaction at the conduct of Sir H. Jones, yet Malcolm was instructed to accept all that the King's envoy had done in Persia.² Apart from carrying out Jones' treaty and taking charge of the subsidy, Lord Minto's instructions with regard to Malcolm's mission read as follows: "One of the most important purposes of your mission is to regain if possible that consideration of which the Local Government has been deprived in the eyes of the Court of Persia by the injudicious and unwarrantable proceedings of Sir H. Jones." General Malcolm was "to convey to the Persian Court a more exact notion of the situation of the British Government in India relatively to the Crown and of those extensive local powers which justify its claim to the highest rank among the

1. Jones to Minto. Tauris, January 30, 1810.

2. The expedition to Kharrak had been given up on account of Jones' engagements with the Persian Government and the preoccupations of Napoleon in Spain and other parts of Europe which lessened the scare caused by the French menace.

dominions of Asia, a rank from which it has been degraded by the effect of Sir H. Jones' proceedings and by his systematic endeavours to exalt his own consequence at the expense of the dignity and reputation it was the sole object of his mission to support." Lord Minto thought that the King of Persia and Mirza Sheffea in their letters to the Governor-General and the ministers in England had used degrading expressions of the Government of India. The Governor-General had noticed with consternation the change in style and language of the letters from Persia. All that seemed to be Sir Harford's doing. "The contrast between the letters of a former period and that which the King of Persia has now addressed to the Government of India is very remarkable in form, address, language and substance. The letter in question is little more than an admonition from a sovereign power to the Governor of a province under a foreign dominion to respect the engagement which the former had concluded with the sovereign of the latter." Malcolm was to put an end to the state of degradation into which the Government of India had fallen in the estimation of the Court of Persia. Lord Minto was aware of a previous exhibition of lofty temper by General Malcolm in Persia, which had resulted in his ignominious departure. On this account the General was given a warning. "I am anxious at the same time that those remonstrances and the reparation which must be demanded, should be urged in the manner least offensive to the Court.....The approach of dangers formerly apprehended cannot now be so sudden as to preclude the advantage of a reference to the authority of this Government; and if circumstances should again arise to suggest the expediency of any extraordinary measures at that court, I shall be prepared to make such arrangements as may be calculated to meet the exigency of the situation." General Malcolm was instructed to procure from the King of Persia the cancellation of his previous letter to the Governor-General and the issue of a new one written in correct style. The letter from Haji Mohammad Hussain Khan was also to be returned.¹ Indeed the most important purpose of Malcolm's mission appeared to be the correction of these letters from the Persian authorities. The sovereign nature of the Company's

1. From Lord Minto to Malcolm. Fort St. George, 26th October, 1809.

powerful government had been flouted by a disorderly state of semi-civilised Orientals, encouraged by the machinations of Sir Harford Jones. The dismissal of the King's envoy by the Governor-General and the correction of letters by a repenting Persian King would restore the Company's prestige in the eyes of the Persians. Such was the view of the Government of India with regard to Malcolm's last mission to Persia.

After his arrival in Persia Malcolm found his progress towards Tehran checked by Sir Harford Jones, who made a great fuss to prevent the reception of an inferior embassy. A great deal of unseemly wrangling followed between the two envoys and the Persians were not slow to make use of this extraordinary state of affairs. Criticising one envoy before the other became a favourite pastime with the Persian officials. The Shah himself indulged in this amusing occupation. To Malcolm's messenger the Shah said, "Sir Harford Jones has written to us to say that in case we allow Malcolm to come, he will immediately return to England.... Are you a Frenchman, or what are you, that he is thus incensed against you."¹ On the other hand the Shah complained to Jones against the State of pomp General Malcolm assumed and the chief minister Mirza Sheffea, assured the King's envoy that all matters between England and Persia would be transacted through him.² But the Persian officials displayed a very realistic attitude. Malcolm, whose generosity had been lavishly exhibited during his first mission, had presents to give; Jones had long since exhausted his store of novelties. So for the time being Malcolm became a favourite, much to Sir Harford's disgust. In June 1810, he was received at the Royal Camp at Sultania and his presents were much appreciated. Malcolm had refused to be presented by Jones; so the latter absented himself at the time of the reception. The Shah conferred upon Malcolm the newly instituted order of the "Lion and the Sun."

In the meanwhile news arrived from England that both the Board of Control³ and the new Secretary of State Lord Wellesley had

1. Home Misc. Series 733, p. 176.

2. Royal Camp Sultania, 24th June, 1810.

3. 4th Nov. 1809, Secret letter of Board of Control to the Governor-General of Bengal.

approved of the proceedings of Sir Harford Jones and the preliminary Treaty, taken to England by Mr. James Morier, Private Secretary to the King's envoy, and the Persian ambassador, Mirza Abdul Hussain.¹ In place of Jones, who had earlier asked to be relieved of his post, Lord Wellesley appointed Sir Gore Ousley as ambassador in Persia. Malcolm returned to India in July, 1810, and early in 1811 Jones left for home. The new ambassador concluded a definitive Treaty, on the basis of the preliminary Treaty, in March 1812.² But this belongs to a new chapter in Anglo-Persian relations.

Malcolm's Third Mission achieved nothing. But he had far-reaching plans for the definitive Treaty. He conveyed his ideas to Jones in a letter sent from the Royal Camp Onjoon on July 15, 1810. 'The Persian Government, he said, was exposed to constant changes and was "weak, venal and unsettled in all its branches." "There is, I conscientiously believe, no country in the Universe where truth is so totally disregarded, where the system of rule is at once so despotic and lax, where the ruled are so oppressed and depraved, and consequently where the virtues of national faith, patriotism and morality are so little known or at least so little practised." To reform the Persians Malcolm proposed to organise a disciplined army of Persians under English and Indian officials. Something like Lord Wellesley's Subsidiary System was proposed for Persia. Objections from Russia were foreseen, but Malcolm was in favour of pressing forward boldly. "We have had the choice of considering Persia as a State which was to be useful as a barrier to our Indian possessions from the difficulties she presented, or as she was susceptible of improvement and of reaching through our aid and exertions a state of increased strength and stability. We have chosen the latter and it is our duty to pursue the policy we have adopted with a decided ardour and spirit."³ Needless to say that those to whom the making of the definitive Treaty with Persia was entrusted, did not possess this decided ardour and spirit. Malcolm's views, however, are of interest inasmuch as they illustrate the extension of the Indian Government's Imperial policies beyond the frontiers of India.

1. Home Misc. Series No. 737, pp. 897-910.

2. Aitchison—Treaties and Sanads (1933 Ed.), Vol. XIII, pp. 56-60.

3. Royal Camp Onjoon, 15th July, 1810. Malcolm to Jones.

The territorial ambitions of the East India Company and its desire for independence stand out clearly from the foregoing survey of Anglo-Persian relations. While England was on the defensive against the onslaughts of Napoleon, the Company's Government in India was grasping for more and more power, till it came into conflict with the Home Government. The conflict was, no doubt, exaggerated by a strong and persistent personal antipathy between Harford Jones and John Malcolm and by the different angles from which the two worked. The King's envoy, representing the point of view of the Foreign Office, pursued a method of peaceful persuasion and a policy of sympathetic understanding with Persia. The representative of the Governor-General was dominated by the forces which had resulted in the expansion of British power in India under Wellesley and advocated the application to Persia of the ideas with which he was familiar in Calcutta. The conflict was not merely a personal wrangle or an accidental muddle. At bottom it was the desire of the Company's Government in India to exercise that control over foreign policy and international relations outside India which it was already vigorously exercising in the smaller international society of Indian States. The Company's growing paramountcy in India and its *de facto* existence as a sovereign state naturally made it eager to play a dominant role in the affairs of the East and in this attempt even the control of the Home Government was found irksome. It was not mere accident that the style of treaties between the Company and some Indian powers underwent a significant change during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Wellesley. The basis of equality gives way to a relationship between superior and inferior. In the treaty alliances with some Rajput chiefs phrases like "obedience" figure prominently. The policy of subsidiary alliances is a well known instance.

In normal times the East India Company might have made good its claim to regulate British affairs in the East by its sole authority. But the exigencies of the Napoleonic war and the genius of Canning made the centralisation of foreign policy necessary. To appoint Sir Harford Jones in the name of the King and to place him under the control of the Governor-General appears to be a clumsy device; but it was a natural thing to do in the circumstances of

1805. The susceptibilities of the Persians could be got over by lending the name of the King to a new mission, but the authority of the Governor-General could not be ignored. The British Government expected the mission to go on smoothly. But after Tilsit Napoleon's challenge was serious and England had her back to the wall. In this precarious situation all the material and diplomatic resources had to be mobilised and concentrated to fight against a new kind of enemy and on a new scale altogether. Unconsciously Sir Harford Jones responded to the changing situation. The awe and respect for Calcutta gave way to the needs and directions of Whitehall. The Supreme Government at Calcutta failed to realise this and continued to insist on its "supreme" character.

The "French menace," which figured largely in the period of Wellesley and Minto and which played the leading part in Anglo-Persian relations at this time, left an important legacy at Calcutta. As far as the projected invasion of India through Central Asia was concerned the "menace" was largely psychological and it was, perhaps, the deliberate policy of the French Government to keep this fear alive in the minds of the English. The evidence seems to point clearly to the conclusion that Napoleon never seriously planned to undertake the invasion of India by land. French activities in India and the Middle East were designed to scare the British. In the minds of British politicians the danger was grave and real. The belief that India could be invaded by a European army marching through Persia and Afghanistan became deep-rooted both in Calcutta and Whitehall. After the fall of Napoleon and the beginning of Russian advance to the East, the "French menace" was transformed into the "Russian menace," and the bugbear of Russia continued to dominate the North-Western frontier policy of the British in India.

In the end it may be pointed out that a new assessment of the respective achievements of Sir Harford Jones and General Malcolm is necessary. History has somewhat underrated the King's envoy and considerably overrated the dashing General from Calcutta. Malcolm was the chosen favourite of Lord Wellesley, the trusted friend and consistent worshipper of the 'All-Highest' at Calcutta. To glorify his achievements and to praise his undoubtedly strong personality a school of the so-called "Malcolmites" grew among the Company's

servants in India. Everything which Malcolm did was praised up and anyone who opposed him met the wrath of the "Malcolmites." Sir Harford Jones was no General and was far out of the inner circle at Calcutta. His past smacked of commercial transactions in the remote outposts of the Company in Asia. He had no powerful supporters in England or in India. He did not wear the "old school-tie" of the high and mighty in Calcutta. His personality was far less vivid than that of Malcolm and his intellect was not outstanding. A sense of wrong coloured the rest of his life. But in spite of all this, Sir Harford Jones did commendable work in Persia and in the understanding of Persian character and of the political realities of his times he came nearer success than his more dazzling rival. On his work and methods, rather than on those of Malcolm, was based the subsequent course of relations between England and Persia. Malcolm was one of the most distinguished servants of the East India Company, but his fame cannot be based on his work in Persia, where defects of temperament and judgment brought about his failure.

P. N. KIRPAL.

APPENDIX I.

THE PERSIAN TREATIES

Translation of a *Firman* from Futteh Ali Shah, King of Persia, and an annexed treaty concluded by Haujee Ibraheem Khaun, Prime Minister, on the part of the King of Persia, by whom he was fully empowered; and by Captain John Malcolm, on the part of the English Government, by virtue of powers delegated to him for that purpose by the Most Noble the Marquis of Wellesley, K. P., Governor-General of India, etc. etc.

FIRMAN.

In the name of the beloved and great God. The earth is the Lord's. Our august commands are issued: That the high in dignity, the exalted in station, the refuge of power and glory, the noble and great in authority, the chiefs of high nobles, the Beglerbeks, the Haukims, the Naibs and Mootasuddies of the Kingdom under our protection (who are raised by our royal favour), become acquainted, that, at this period, the dignified and eminent in station, the prudent, able and penetrating, the greatest of the exalted followers of the Messiah, Captain John Malcolm, deputed from a glorious quarter (from the Government of the King of England, whose Court resembles the firmament, an emperor in dignity like Alexander, possessing the power of the globe, and from the repository of glory, greatness and ability, endowed with nobility, power, and justice, the Governor-General of the Kingdom of Hindoostan), for the purpose of establishing union and friendship between the two great States, has arrived at our threshold, founded on justice, and has been honored by admission to our royal presence of conspicuous splendor, and has expressed a desire that the foundations of amity and union should be laid between the two States, that they should be connected together in the bonds of friendship and harmony, and that a constant union and reciprocal good understanding should exist. We, from our august selves, have given our consent, and have granted the requests and desires of the high in rank above mentioned, and a treaty, sealed with the zeal of the ministers of our ever-enduring Government, has been given to him; and you, exalted in station, are positively enjoined of the necessity (after you become informed

of our royal and august order) for all of you acting in strict conformity with the conditions of the treaty concluded and exchanged between the high in rank, the exalted in station, the great and glorious in power, near to the throne, on whom the royal confidence is placed, Haujee Ibraheem Khaun, and the high in rank the envoy (Captain John Malcolm) whose titles have been before enumerated. Let no one act contrary to this high command, or to the contents of the annexed treaty; and should it ever be represented to us that any of the great nobles conduct themselves in opposition to the stipulations of this treaty, or are in this respect guilty or negligent, such will incur our displeasure and punishment, and be exposed to our royal anger, which is like fire; and let them view this as an obligation.

Dated in the month of Shaubaun, in the year of the Hijree 1215, corresponding with the month of January, A. D. 1801.

Sealed in the usual form on the back of the *Firman* by the following ministers:

Haujee Ibraheem Khan, Meerza Shuffee, Meerza Roza Kooli, Meerza Assud Oollah, Meerza Rezy, Meerza Ahmud, Meerza Mortiza Kooli, Meerza Fazoollah, and Meerza Yoosuf.

TREATY ANNEXED.

PREAMBLE.

Praise be to God, who has said, perform your covenant, for the performance of your covenant shall be inquired into hereafter.

As establishing the obligations of friendship between all mankind is a charge from the Almighty, and it is a most laudable and excellent institution, and as the Creator is pleased, and the happiness and tranquillity of his creatures consulted by it, therefore, at this happy period of auspicious respect, a treaty has been concluded between the high in dignity, the exalted in station, attended by fortune, of great and splendid power, the greatest among the high *viziers*, in whom confidence is placed, the faithful of the powerful Government, the adorned with greatness, power, glory, splendor, and fortune, Haujee Ibraheem Khan, on being granted leave, and vested with authority from the part of the high King, whose Court is like that of Solomon, the asylum

o the world, the sign of the power of God, the jewel in the ring of kings, the ornament in the cheek of eternal empire, the grace of the beauty of sovereignty and royalty, the King of the universe, like Cahermaun the mansion of mercy and justice, the phoenix of good fortune, the eminence of never-fading prosperity, the King powerful as Alexander, who has no equal among the princes, exalted to majesty by the Heavens in this globe, a shade from the shade of the Most High, a Khoosrow whose saddle is the moon, and whose stirrup is the new moon, a prince of great rank before whom the sun is concealed.

ARABIC VERSE.

(Thy benevolence is universally dispensed; everywhere drops are scattered; thy kindness shadows cities; may God fix firm the basis of thy dominions.)

And the high in dignity, the great and able in power, the adorning of those acquainted with manners, Captain John Malcolm, delegated from the sublime quarter of the high in power (seated on a throne, the asylum of the world, the chief jewel in the crown of royalty and sovereignty, the anchor of the vessel of victory and fortune, the ship on the sea of glory and empire, the blazing sun in the sky of greatness and glory, lord of the countries of England and India, may God strengthen his territories, and establish his glory and command upon the seas!) in the manner explained in his credentials, which are sealed with the seal of the most powerful and most glorious possessing fortune, the original of rank, splendor, and nobility, the ornament of the world, the completer of the works of mankind, the Governor-General of India.

This treaty between the two great powers shall be binding on race after race, and the two Governments must ever, while the world exists, act in conformity to what is now settled.

Article 1st. The merchants of the high contracting States are to travel and carry on their affairs in the territories of both nations in full security and confidence, and the rulers and governors of all cities are to consider it their duty to protect from injury their cattle and goods.

Article 2nd. The traders and merchants of the kingdoms of England or Hindoostan that are in the service of the English Government shall be permitted to settle in any of the

seaports or cities of the boundless empire of Persia (which may God preserve from calamity) that they prefer, and no Government duties, taxes, or requisitions shall ever be collected on any goods that are the actual property of either of the Governments, the usual duties on such to be taken from purchasers.

Article 3rd. Should it happen that either the persons or property of merchants are injured or lost, by thieves and robbers, the utmost exertions shall be made to punish the delinquents and recover the property. And if any merchant or trader of Persia evades or delays the payment of a debt to the English Government, the latter are authorised to use every possible mode for the recovery of their demands, taking care to do so in communication and with the knowledge of the ruler or governor of the place, who is to consider it as his duty to grant on such occasion every aid in his power. And should any merchants of Persia be in Englia India attending to their mercantile concerns, the officers of the English Government are not to prevent them carrying on their affairs, but to aid and favor them; and the above-mentioned merchants are to recover their debts and demands in the mode prescribed by the customs and laws of the English Government.

Article 4th. If any persons in the empire of Persia die indebted to the English Government, the ruler of the place must exert his power to have such demand satisfied before those of any other creditors whatever. The servants of the English Government resident in Persia are permitted to hire as many domestics, natives of that country, as are necessary for the transaction of their affairs; and they are authorised to punish such in cases of misconduct in the manner they judge most expedient, provided such punishment does not extend to life or limb. In such cases, the punishment to be inflicted by the ruler or governor of the place.

Article 5th. The English are at liberty to build houses and mansions in any of the ports or cities of Persia that they choose, and they may sell or rent such houses or mansions at pleasure. And should ever a ship belonging to the English Government be in a damaged state in any of the ports of Persia, or one of Persia be in that condition in an English harbor, the chiefs and rulers of the ports and harbors of the respective nations are to consider it as their

duty to give every aid to refit and repair vessels so situated; and if it happens that any of the vessels of either nation are sunk or shipwrecked in or near the ports or shores of either country, on such occasions whatever part of the property is recovered shall be restored to its owners or their heirs, and a just hire is to be allowed by the owners to those who recover it.

Final Article. Whenever any native of England, or India, in the service of the English Government, resident in Persia, wishes to leave that country, he is to suffer obstruction from no person, but to be at full liberty to do so, and to carry with him his property.

The articles of the treaty between the two States are fixed and determined. That person who turns from God turns from his own soul.

Dated in the month of Rumzaun, in the year of the Hijree 1215, corresponding with the month of January, A. D. 1801.

Seal of	Seal of
HAUJEE IBRAHEEM KHAN	CAPTAIN JOHN MALCOLM,
(Signed)	JOHN MALCOLM, ENVOY.

ADDITIONAL ARTICLE.

It is further written in sincerity, that on iron, lead, steel, broadcloth, and carpets, that are exclusively the property of the English Government, no duties whatever shall be taken from the sellers; a duty not exceeding one per cent to be levied on the purchasers. And the duties imposts, and customs which are at this period established in Persia and India (on other goods) are to remain fixed, and not to be increased.

The high in rank, Haujee Khalleel Khan, Malek-oo-Tijaur, is charged and entrusted with the arrangement and settlement of the remaining points relative to commerce.

Seal of	Seal of
HAUJEE IBRAHEEM KHAN.	CAPTAIN JOHN MALCOLM,
(Signed).	JOHN MALCOLM-ENVOY.

POLITICAL TREATY.

Translation of the *Firman* from Futteh Ali Shah, King of Persia, and of an annexed treaty, concluded by Haujee Ibraheem Khan, Prime Minister, on the part of the King of Persia, by whom

he was fully empowered ; and by Captain John Malcolm, on the part of the English Government, by virtue of powers delegated to him for that purpose by the Most Noble the Marquis of Wellesley, K. P., Governor-General, etc. etc.

FIRMAN.

In the name of the beloved and great God. The earth is the Lord's. Our august commands are issued : That the high in rank, the exalted in station, the great rulers, officers and writers of the ports, sea-coasts, and islands of the provinces of Faurs and Khoozistaun, do consider themselves as particularly honored and advanced by the royal favor ; and whereas, at this period, the foundations of union and friendship have been cemented, and the habits of amity and intercourse have been increased between the ministers of the (Persian) State of eternal duration and the ministers of the high Government of the refulgent sun of the sky of royalty, greatness, and eminence, the sovereign of the countries of England and India ; and as various engagements and treaties calculated for duration and, permanence, and for mutual good understanding, have been contracted, therefore this command from the palace of glory, requiring obedience, has been proclaimed, that you, high in rank, do cheerfully comply, and execute the clear sense and meaning of what has been established. And should ever any persons of the French nation attempt to pass your ports or boundaries, or desire to establish themselves either on the shores or frontiers, you are to take means to expel and extirpate them, and never to allow them to obtain a footing in any place ; and you are at full liberty and authorised to disgrace and slay them. You are to look upon it as your duty to disgrace and slay them. You are to look upon it as your duty to aid and act in a friendly manner to all traders, merchants, and men of rank of the English nation. All such you are to consider as possessing the favor of the King, and you must act in conformity to the conditions of the annexed treaty, that has been concluded between the trustworthy of the high State, the bracelet of the graceful Government, Haujee Ibraheem Khan, and the high in rank, Captain John Malcolm. View this as an obligation.

Dated the 12th of Shaubaun, in the year of the Hijree 1215, corresponding with January, A. D. 1801.

Sealed in the usual form on the back of the *Firman* by the following Ministers :

Haujee Ibrahim Khan, Meerza Shaffee, Meerza Raza Kooli, Meerza Assud Oollah, Meerza Rezy, Meerza Ahmad, Meerza Moortiza Kooli, Meerza Fazoollah, Meerza Yoosuf.

TREATY ANNEXED.

PREAMBLE.

Praise be unto God, who said, O you who believe, perform your contracts ; perform your covenant with God when you enter into covenant with Him, and violate not your engagements after the ratification thereof.

After the voice is raised to the praise and glory of the God of the world, and the brain is perfumed with the scent of the saints and prophets, to whom be health and glory ! whose rare perfections are perpetually chanted by birds of melodious notes, furnished with two, three and four pair of wings, and to the highest seated in the heavens, for whom good has been predestined, and the perfume mixed with musk, which scenteth the celestial mansions of those that sing hymns in the real sphere, and to the light of the flame of the Most High, which gives irradiate splendor to the collected view of those who dwell in the heavenly regions, the clear meaning of (the treaty) which has been established on a solid basis is fully explained in this page, and it is fixed as a prescription of law, that in this world of existence and trouble, in the universe of creation and concord there is no action among those of mankind that tends more to the perfection of the human race, or to answer the end of their being and existence, than that of cementing friendship and of establishing intercourse, communication and connexion betwixt each other. The image reflected from the mirror of accomplishment is a tree fruitful and abundant, and one that produces good, both now and hereafter. To illustrate the allusions that it has been proper to make, and to explain these metaphors worthy of exposition, at this happy period of auspicious aspect, a treaty has been concluded between the high in dignity, the exalted in station, attended by fortune of great and splendid power, the greatest among the high *viziers*, in whom confidence is placed, the faithful of the powerful Government, the adorned with greatness, power, glory,

splendor and fortune, Haujee Ibraheem Khan, on being granted leave and vested with authority from the part of the High King, whose court is like that of Solomon, the asylum of the world, the sign of the power of God, the jewel in the ring of kings, the ornament in the cheek of eternal empire, the grace of the beauty of sovereignty and royalty, the King of the universe, like Cahermaun the mansion of mercy and justice, the phoenix of good fortune, the eminence of never-fading prosperity, the King powerful as Alexander, who has no equal among the Princes, exalted to majesty by the Heavens in this globe, a shade from the shade of the Most High, a Khoosrow whose saddle is the moon, and whose stirrup is the new moon, a Prince of great rank before whom the sun is concealed.

ARABIC VERSE.

(Thy benevolence is universally dispensed ; everywhere drops are scattered ; thy kindness shadows cities ; may God fix firm the basis of thy dominion, and may God fix and extend thy power over the servants of the Almighty !)

And the high in dignity, the great and able in power, the adorer of those acquainted with manners, Captain John Malcolm, delegated from the sublime quarter of the high in power (seated on a throne, the asylum of the world, the chief jewel in the crown of royalty and sovereignty, the anchor of the vessel of victory and fortune, the ship on the sea of glory and empire, the blazing sun in the sky of greatness and glory, lord of the countries of England and India, may God strengthen his territories and establish his glory and command upon the seas !) in the manner explained in his credentials, which are sealed with the seal of the most powerful and most glorious possessing fortune, the origin of rank, splendor and nobility, the ornament of the world, the completer of the works of mankind, the Governor-General of India.

This treaty between these two great States shall be binding on race after race, and the two Governments must ever, while the world exists, act in conformity to what is now settled.

Article 1st. As long as the sun illuminating the circle of the two great contracting parties shines on their sovereign dominions, and bestows light on the whole world, the beautiful image of excellent union shall remain fixed on the mirror of duration and

perpetuity, the thread of shameful enmity and distance shall be cut, conditions of mutual aid and assistance between the two States shall be substituted, and all causes of hatred and hostility shall be banished.

Article 2nd. If the King of the Afghans should ever show a resolution to invade India, which is subject to the government of the monarch (above-mentioned), the prince of high rank, the King of England, an army overthrowing mountains, furnished with all warlike stores, shall be appointed from the State of the conspicuous and exalted high and fixed in power (the King of Persia) to lay waste and desolate the Afghan dominions, and every exertion shall be employed to ruin and humble the above-mentioned nation.

Article 3rd. Should it happen that the King of the Afghan nation ever becomes desirous of opening the gates of peace and friendship with the Government of the King (of Persia), who is in rank like Solomon, in dignity, like Jumsheer, the shade of God, who has bestowed his mercy and kindness on the earth, when negotiations are opened for an amicable adjustment, it shall be stipulated in the peace concluded that the King of the Afghans or his armies shall abandon all design of attack on the territories subject to the government of the King above-mentioned, who is worthy of royalty, the King of England.

Article 4th. Should ever any king of the Afghans, or any person of the French nation, commence war and hostilities with the powerful of the ever-enduring State (of the King of Persia), the Rulers of the Government of the (King of England), whose Court is like heaven, and who has been before mentioned, shall (on such event) send as many cannon and warlike stores as possible, with necessary apparatus, attendants, and inspectors, and such (supply) shall be delivered over at one of the ports of Persia, whose boundaries are conspicuous to the officers of the high in dignity, the King of Persia.

Article 5th. Should it ever happen that an army of the French nation, actuated by design and deceit, attempts to settle, with a view of establishing themselves on any of the islands or shores of Persia, a conjunct force shall be appointed by the two high contracting States, to act in co-operation, and to destroy and put an

end to the foundations of their treason. It is a condition, if such ever happens, and the conquering troops (of Persia) march, that the officers of the government of the (King of England), who is powerful as the heavens, and has been before mentioned, shall load, transport, and deliver (for their service) as great a quantity of necessaries, stores and provisions as they possibly can ; and if ever any of the great men of the French nation express a wish or desire to obtain a place of residence or dwelling on any of the islands or shores of the Kingdom of Persia, that they may there raise the standard of abode or settlement, such request or representation shall not be consented unto by the high in rank of the State encompassed with justice (the Government of Persia), and leave for their residing in such place shall not be granted.

While time endures, and while the world exists, the contents of this exalted treaty shall remain an admired picture in the mirror of duration and perpetuity, and submission to the fair image on this conspicuous page shall be everlasting.

Seal of

HAUJEE IBRAHEEM KHAN.

Seal of

CAPTAIN JOHN MALCOLM,

(Signed). JOHN MALCOLM, Envoy

APPENDIX II.

PRELIMINARY TREATY CONCLUDED BY SIR HARFORD JONES WITH THE SHAH OF PERSIA IN 1809.

In the name of Him who is ever necessary, who is all sufficient, who is ever lasting, and who is the only Protector.

In these times distinguished by felicity, the excellent ambassador Sir Harford Jones, Baronet, Member of the Honourable Imperial Ottoman Order of the Crescent, has arrived at the royal city of Tehran in quality of ambassador from His Majesty the King of England (titles), bearing His Majesty's credential letter, and charged with full powers united with the Great Seal of England empowering him to strengthen the friendship and consolidate the strict union subsisting between the high States of England and Persia. His Majesty the King of Persia (titles), therefore, by a special *Firman* delivered to the said ambassador, has appointed the most excellent and noble lords, Mirza Mohamed Shafer, qualified with the title of Moatammed ed-Dowlah, his first *vizier*, and Haujee Mohamed Hussain Khan, qualified with the title of Ameen-ed-Dowlah, one of the ministers of Record, to be his plenipotentiaries to confer and discuss with the aforesaid ambassador of His Britannic Majesty all matters and affairs touching the formation and consolidation of friendship, alliance and strict union between the two high States and to arrange and finally conclude the same for the benefit and advantage of both kingdoms. In consequence whereof, after diverse meetings and discussions, the aforesaid plenipotentiaries have resolved that the following Articles are for the benefit and advantage of both the high States, and hereafter to be accordingly for ever observed :—

Article 1. That as some time will be required to arrange and form a definitive Treaty of alliance and friendship between the two high States, and as the circumstances of the world make it necessary for something to be done without loss of time, it is agreed these Articles, which are to be regarded as preliminary, shall become a basis for establishing a sincere and everlasting definite Treaty of strict friendship and union. And it is agreed that the said definitive Treaty, precisely expressing the wishes and obligations of each party,

shall be signed and sealed by the said plenipotentiaries and afterwards become binding on both the high contracting parties.

Article 2. It is agreed that the preliminary Articles formed with the hand of truth and sincerity shall not be changed or altered, but there shall arise from them a daily increase of friendship, which shall last for ever between the two most serene kings, their heirs, successors, their subjects, dominions, provinces and countries.

Article 3. His Majesty the King of Persia judges it necessary to declare that from the date of these preliminary Articles, every treaty or agreement he may have made with any one of the powers of Europe becomes null and void, and that he will not permit any European force whatever to pass through Persia, either towards India, or towards the parts of that country.


Article 4. In case any European forces have invaded or shall invade the territories of His Majesty the King of Persia, His Britannic Majesty will afford to His Majesty the King of Persia a force, or in lieu of it, a subsidy with warlike ammunition, such as guns, muskets, etc., and officers to the amount that may be to the advantage of both parties for the expulsion of the force so invading, and the number of these forces, or the amount of the subsidy, ammunition, etc., shall be hereafter regulated in the definitive Treaty. In case His Majesty the King of England should make peace with such European power, His Majesty shall use his utmost endeavours to negotiate and procure a peace between His Persian Majesty and such power. But if, which God forbid, His Britannic Majesty's efforts for this purpose should fail of success, then the forces or subsidy, according to the amount mentioned in the definitive Treaty, shall still continue in the service of the King of Persia as long as the said European forces shall remain in the territories of His Persian Majesty, or until peace is concluded between His Persian Majesty and the said European power. And it is further agreed that in case the dominions of His Britannic Majesty in India are attacked or invaded by the Afghans or any other power, His Majesty the King of Persia shall afford a force for the protection of the said dominions according to the stipulations contained in the definitive Treaty.

Article 5. If a detachment of British troops has arrived from India in the Gulf of Persia, and by the consent of His Persian Majesty

landed on the Island of Carrack, or at any of the Persian ports, they shall not in any manner possess themselves of such places, and from the date of these preliminary Articles the said detachment shall be at the disposal of His Majesty the King of Persia, the amount of which shall be settled in the definitive Treaty.

Article 6. But if the said troops remain by the desire of His Majesty the King of Persia either at Carrack or any other port in the Gulf of Persia, they shall be treated by the Governor there in the most friendly manner, and orders shall be given to all the Governors of Paristan that whatever quantity of provisions, etc., may be necessary shall, on being paid for, be furnished to the said troops at the fair prices of the day.

Article 7. In case war takes place between His Persian Majesty and the Afghans, His Majesty the King of Great Britain shall not take any part therein, unless it be at the desire (of His Persian Majesty).



THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND MAHARAJA RANJIT SINGH (1809-1814)

By the treaty of the 25th April, 1809, concluded between the British Government and Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the course pursued by the river Sutlej had been finally fixed upon as the southern boundary of the Kingdom of Lahore. A few of the territorial possessions of Maharaja Ranjit Singh situated on the left bank of that river—namely, those that had been acquired by him prior to his last expedition to this quarter—were, indeed, still left with him to be ruled over in sovereignty. But, as stipulated, he was not to maintain in these possessions more troops than were absolutely necessary to police them, nor was he to commit or countenance any act of aggression against the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs, who were thenceforth to be considered as under the protection of the British Government.¹

Maharaja Ranjit Singh, although he had thus been balked of his cherished ambition to hold sway over the entire Sikh community, was not unhappy to have purchased peace even at this heavy price. A shrewd politician, he feared to risk a collision with the British Government at this stage; for aught he knew, it might have proved fatal to the very existence of his infant kingdom. However, he was yet far from convinced of the pacific intentions of the British Government, which appeared to him to be only waiting for a favourable opportunity to compass his overthrow. The British Government, too, although it had seen him yield every point of contention with a view to obviate an immediate rupture, found it hard to believe that he had really relinquished his designs on the Cis-Sutlej States. Each of the two parties, in consequence, continued to harbour deep distrust of the intentions and movements of

1. The following are the articles of this treaty:—

(a) "The British Government will not assist between the British Government and the State considered by the former to be on a footing of the most favoured powers; and the British Government will have no concern with the territories and subjects of the Raja to the northward of the river Sutlej."

(b) "The Raja will never maintain in the territory which he occupies on the left bank of the river Sutlej more troops than are necessary for the internal duties of that territory, nor commit or suffer any encroachment on the possessions or rights of the chiefs in its vicinity."

(c) "In the event of a violation of any of the preceding articles, or of a departure from the rules of friendship on the part of the either State, this treaty shall be considered to be null and void." (Punjab Government Records, Bk. No. 16, (1st), Srl. No. 16., pp. 71-74.)

the other, notwithstanding the sincere desire of both to preserve peace and consolidate friendship. Nevertheless, outward manifestations of mutual confidence were made in the hope that they might eventually lead to the establishment of real cordiality between the two States. The incidents which illustrate the general trend of Anglo-Sikh relations during the first five years after the conclusion of this treaty, when mutual confidence may be said to have been fairly established, constitute an interesting study, which it is the purpose of this paper to unfold.

The first and most important of these facts was the continued occupation of Ludhiana by British troops. It was symbolic of the distrust then existing between the two States. This action was forced upon Lord Minto by the prevailing distrust of the Maharaja and by the opinion of his local officials.

When Ludhiana was first occupied by Lt.-Col. Ochterlony on the 18th February, 1809, the British Government had little thought of retaining it permanently in its own hands. Its only object in pushing forward a detachment to this post had been to convince Maharaja Ranjit Singh that the British Government was determined at all costs to preclude the extension of his sovereignty beyond the Sutlej. The strategic importance of Ludhiana as an obstacle to the advance of a European army through the Punjab was great; but the probability of such a development was no longer there to urge its continued occupation beyond the needs of the hour.¹ There were numerous considerations against the maintenance of a permanent military post at this station. Its close proximity to the frontier of the Kingdom of Lahore was bound to make it a perpetual source of irritation to the injured pride of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, hindering seriously the promotion of cordiality between the two States. At the same time, its great distance from the British base at Karnal and the consequent difficulty of supporting it by early reinforcements, should some sudden development overtake the troops stationed at this isolated post, were highly repugnant to military strategy. The Cis-Sutlej Chiefs, too, could not be expected to view with equanimity the continuance of a British detachment in

1. Edmonstone to Ochterlony, 30th January, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 7., pp. 42—47.)

their midst when the danger from Maharaja Ranjit Singh had ceased to shake their nerves. Besides, it had been no part of Lord Minto's plan to interfere in any manner whatsoever in the internal administration or mutual disputes of these chiefs. The protection to be extended to them was hardly more than incidental to the British resolution to confine the Kingdom of Lahore to the right bank of the Sutlej; and had been intended by Lord Minto to be no more than a mere guarantee to them against the future encroachments of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. He was determined, therefore, as soon as it should become practicable, to withdraw the detachment then planted at Ludhiana.¹ Ochterlony was even instructed to cause it to be generally understood that the maintenance of the advanced post on the Sutlej was not intended to be a permanent measure.²

Ochterlony, with his characteristic independence of judgment, however, took a wholly different view of the situation and strongly urged Lord Minto not to relinquish the advanced post at Ludhiana and sacrifice permanent benefits to temporary expedients. "As it affects the Raja of Lahore," he wrote to the Secretary to Government in a despatch, dated the 6th May, 1809, "it is certainly a menacing position. But as an object of jealousy, it will every day be viewed with more and more indifference as our forbearance and moderation become more conspicuous." "As a grand step in advance towards a European enemy," he continued, "it cannot be considered unimportant, and as a perpetual memento of the obligations due to us by the chiefs we protect and of the fidelity and attachment we have a consequent right to expect, it will have its use." Besides, a good deal of expense had already been incurred in establishing a cantonment at Ludhiana and in repairing the fort already in existence at that place. In view of these considerations, Ochterlony felt himself justified, pending a reconsideration of the problem by the Governor General in Council, in withholding from the public a communication of the resolution of his Government to withdraw this post at an early period³.

1. Edmonstone to Carey, 3rd April, 1809. (I. R. D. Sec. Cons. No. 48 of 3rd April, 1809.)

2. Edmonstone to Ochterlony, 10th April, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 14, pp. 135—156.)

3. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, 6th May, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10, Srl. No. 14, pp. 33—35.)

In some subsequent despatches, too, he took occasion to repeat his opinion of the desirability of retaining Ludhiana as a permanent military post. The definitive nature of the rights acquired by the terms of the treaty with the Maharaja of Lahore and assumed by those of the declaration¹ of protection to the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs had imposed, by implication, grave obligations on the British Government which, Ochterlony believed, it could not discharge efficiently if the detachment were withdrawn from Ludhiana. The desirability of maintaining a constant watch on the movements of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the possibility of his attempting to despatch across the Sutlej more troops than might be necessary to police his recognised possessions on its left bank, the probability of the occurrence of occasional clashes between his officials and the protected chiefs and, above all, the necessity of exercising a general control over all the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs imperatively demanded, in the opinion of Ochterlony, the continuance of the military post at Ludhiana. The least that his Government must do, he felt, was to retain the fort of Ludhiana garrisoned by a few companies and placed under an officer who should be the channel of communications with the Maharaja of Lahore and who should exercise a general control over the protected chiefs. The assumption of the latter of these functions appeared to him all the more essential with a view constantly to keep the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs in full recollection of their dependence on the British Government as well as to prevent internecine warfare, violence and bloodshed among them.²

But however strong these arguments, they failed for the moment to carry conviction with Lord Minto, who still continued of the opinion that the recall of the detachment from Ludhiana was absolutely essential to restore mutual confidence between the two States.³ Not only that. He actually caused (3rd June, 1809) an official communication to be addressed to Maharaja Ranjit Singh declaring to him in positive terms his intention to direct, as

1. See *Ilah-nama*, 3rd May, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 11, Srl. No. 9, p. 10.)

2. (a). Ochterlony to Seton, 26th May, 1809, (P. G. R. Bk. No. 2, Srl. Nos. 140 and 141, pp. 221—226.)

(b). Ochterlony to Carey, 6th June, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10 (2nd), Srl. No. 214, pp. 76—79.)

3. Edmonstone to Seton, 3rd June, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 16, Srl. No. 21-B, pp. 95—104.)

a token of his confidence in the Maharaja, the return of the detachment from Ludhiana "as soon as may be found convenient."¹

Even the limited occupation of Ludhiana to be secured by the retention of the fort only, urged by Ochterlony as the minimum requirement of the situation, did not commend itself to Lord Minto. The suggestion appeared to him to have been prompted by an erroneous conception of the nature and scope of the protection which had been extended to the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs. The exercise of a close control and minute supervision over the affairs of the protected chiefs and the interposition of British authority and power to guarantee the possessions and rights of each against the other being contrary to his deliberate views and settled policy, Lord Minto could not but insist on "the early and entire" evacuation of Ludhiana².

It was left to Mr. Metcalfe, however, to vindicate the stand taken by Lt.-Col. Ochterlony. In an elaborate despatch, dated the 17th June 1809, he vigorously urged on Lord Minto the extreme urgency of interposing British authority and power to maintain the *status quo* among the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs. If once the determination of the British Government to refrain from every interference in their disputes was suffered generally to be understood, he pleaded, it was sure to prove destructive of the peace of their country by

1. Here are the relevant extracts from this letter :—

"I repose the fullest reliance on the professions of sincere attachment contained in your letter and on your strict adherence to the engagements which you have contracted. *Such indeed is my confidence in this respect that I shall not now think it necessary to maintain a detachment of British troops in advance for the protection of those chiefs who are guaranteed by the treaty.* I shall consider them secure against the encroachments of your servants and dependants by the faith of your engagements."

"It is accordingly my intention to direct the return of the detachment at present stationed at Ludhiana as soon as may be found convenient. You are now, however so well convinced of the amicable views and disposition of the British Government that the continuance or removal of the detachment can be a matter of little concern to you. When the power of the Maratha Chiefs was established in the north of Hindostan, their troops were frequently advanced into the country between the Sutlej and Jumna without occasioning in your mind the slightest apprehension or exciting on your part any enquiry or solicitude regarding the object of their advance. With the experience you have now had of the amicable disposition of the British Government and with your knowledge of its invariable adherence to the obligations of its engagements, which is proverbial throughout Hindostan, I expect that you will manifest the same degree of confidence in the British Government."

See Lord Minto to Maharaja Ranjit Singh, 3rd June, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 16, Srl. No. 24 (encl.), pp. 115—120.)

2. Edmonstone to Ochterlony, 13th June, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 17, pp. 181—189.)

serving as a perpetual source of incitement to the strong among them to prey upon their weak neighbours. Maharaja Ranjit Singh, too, although expressly debarred by the terms of the treaty from every interference in their affairs, might not disdain, under such favourable circumstances, clandestinely to take upon himself the direction and control of these disputes with a view to aggrandise his own influence among them. Such a development, he feared, might prove dangerous to British interests in some future contingency; at any rate, it would run positively counter to the spirit of the treaty and the policy which had dictated every measure connected with it. He was, therefore, strongly of the opinion that the British Government, while it abstained from every interference in their internal administration, should publicly declare its determination to maintain the existing state of property and rights and to admit of no future act of violence by any chief against another¹.

The logic of Metcalfe's arguments was irresistible. A policy of non-intervention in the disputes among the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs could only tend to repeat history and establish, as once before, the power and influence of Maharaja Ranjit Singh over the territories between the Sutlej and the Jumna. Lord Minto, who had not hesitated to run the risk of hostilities to secure from the Maharaja a relinquishment of all his claims and designs over this area, could not now see himself being tricked into a defeat by his own pusillanimity. Ochterlony had to be authorised, therefore, to exercise a general superintendence over all the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs, to take cognisance of complaints brought before him and to adjudicate upon disputed claims with a view to preserve the *status quo*².

The resolution with regard to the recall of the detachment, too, had thus to be suspended indefinitely, and later abrogated altogether, as a matter of course. Some embarrassment was inevitably caused by the official intimation to Maharaja Ranjit Singh which had announced the intention of the Governor General to withdraw the post at Ludhiana "as soon as may be found

1. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, 17th June, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 19 (encl.), pp. 205—223.)

2. Edmonstone to Carey, 1st July, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 19 (encl.), pp. 197—204.)

convenient." Supposing, however, that this communication had been detained by the Resident at Delhi, who was not unaware of a fresh reference on the subject having been made to Calcutta, Lord Minto drew up a substitute for it omitting from its text the passage relative to the early recall of the detachment¹. But the ill-suited original had already been transmitted to the Maharaja before this substitute could reach the Resident's hand at Delhi.² The incident was considered extremely regrettable, although no evil consequences were apprehended to follow from it. The communication had been so worded as to leave the British Government not only with a certain latitude with regard to the determination of the time for withdrawing the detachment but also with an option, implied in its concluding paragraph³, to re-advance troops to any quarter in the protected area without reference to the desire or opinion of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. It was, therefore, considered in no way inconsistent with any commitment of the British Government, or unwarranted by its rights, indefinitely to continue the detachment at Ludhiana⁴.

Thus Ludhiana was constituted into an important outpost of the British Empire in India and Ochterlony commissioned to scan from its watch-tower the horizon of the Kingdom of Lahore and to invigilate over the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs. The close proximity of this post to the territories of Maharaja Ranjit Singh was bound to give rise to many unpleasant incidents, and the first to happen was an assault by some of his adherents on a British surveyor, Lt. White, and his party. This officer had been deputed by the British Government soon after the conclusion of the treaty with the Maharaja to survey some districts along the left bank of the Sutlej then avowedly under British protection¹. His route lying through some of the possessions belonging to the Kingdom of Lahore on this side of the Sutlej, the Maharaja had previously been apprised of the intended measure and the necessary passport secured from

1. Edmonstone to Ochterlony, 26th June, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 18, pp. 190—195.)

2. Seton to Edmonstone, 15th July, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 3, Srl. No. 52, pp. 154—156.)

3. Supra p. 6. Footnote No. 1.

4. Ochterlony to Worsley, 2nd May, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10 (2nd), Srl. No. 168, p. 57.)

him. Moreover, Dewan Mohkam Chand had been induced to despatch a *vakil* of his own to accompany Lt. White during his progress through these territories with a view to secure him from every molestation and inconvenience¹. But hardly had the British surveyor gone a few days' march from Ludhiana when he encountered positive hostility at a small country town, Dharmkote, owing allegiance to Maharaja Ranjit Singh. The police officer of this place, followed by quite a crowd of armed people, came out to resist the further progress of Lt. White and even attempted to lay violent hands on his baggage and supplies. The Dewan's *vakil*, who interposed to pacify the police officer and the infuriated mob, was himself manhandled, beaten and insulted. Lt. White was thus obliged to relinquish his undertaking and to return to Ludhiana forthwith².

The circumstances attending this incident lent a strong colour to the suspicion that the outrage had originated in secret orders from Ranjit Singh himself. However, Ochterlony was disposed to take a more charitable view of them and ascribe the unfortunate occurrence to the weakness of the Maharaja's authority in these possessions.³ Nevertheless, he addressed an immediate communication to Maharaja Ranjit Singh complaining against the treatment which had been meted out to Lt. White and requesting the presence at Ludhiana of an accredited *vakil* who should be furnished with writs (*parwanas*) for all important officials through whose jurisdiction the surveying party was to pass.⁴

The Maharaja, in reply, expressed his regret at what had happened and informed Ochterlony of his having already issued strict orders to the effect desired by him. A regular *vakil*, too, was now despatched, as requested, to secure for Lt. White a safe passage through the Maharaja's possessions.⁵ The incident thus closed

1. *Ibid.*

2. (a) Ochterlony to Worsley, 6th May, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10 (2nd), Srl. No. 176, p. 61.)

(b) Ochterlony to Edmonstone, 30th May, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10 (1st), Srl. No. 16, pp. 35—37.)

3. Ochterlony to Worsley, 6th May, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10 (2nd), Srl. No. 176, p. 61.)

4. Ochterlony to Ranjit Singh, 9th May, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 11, Srl. No. 10, pp. 11-12.)

5. Ranjit Singh to Ochterlony, undated (some time in May, 1809). (P. G. R. Bk. No. 11, Srl. No. 11, p. 12.)

without any further ado. It is remarkable on the whole for the cheerful readiness with which Maharaja Ranjit Singh sought to smooth away all difficulties that could possibly interrupt the establishment of harmonious relations between the two States. "Being every way desirous of your contentment and satisfaction," he thus concluded his reply to Ochterlony, "I hope you will consider the interests of both the families¹ as the same and placing every assurance in me, I trust you will write to me without ceremony on every affair, depending on its being accomplished."

The anxiety of Maharaja Ranjit Singh to do everything in his power to preserve peace and friendship with the British Government is still more conspicuously borne out by the following extract from one of his letters to Ochterlony. It was written in reply to a complaint from him against the conduct of Sardar Garbha Singh of Bhartgarh, a vassal of the Maharaja.

"You have alluded that he might be the means, God forbid, of estranging our mutual friendship. My dear Sir, what can this mean? By the blessings of the Self-sufficient Disposer a treaty of mutual goodwill and friendship has been happily concluded between the two mighty States, and unceasing pains are taken on both sides for its preservation. *It cannot be impaired by the instigations of such a person, who shall not be allowed to draw even his breath but for the good of both the States.* As far as regards me and this affair, you may put your mind perfectly at ease. *It would be very improper to represent it to Calcutta, and I hope this shall not be done.* In every instance I have taken and shall take proper care that there be no cause for difference (between the two States) considering both sides (as I do) to be a family of one. I hope you will without ceremony write to me on any affair or business, assured that I shall accomplish the same."²

No less great was the solicitude of the British Government to see the two States settle down to relations of mutual cordiality, nor less conspicuous its contribution to bring about that happy consummation.

1. Meaning thereby States.

2. (a) Ranjit Singh to Ochterlony, undated (some time in May, 1809), (P. G. R. Bk. No. 11, Srl. No. 13, p. 15.)

(b) Ochterlony to Edmonstone, 30th May, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10, Srl. No. 16, pp. 35-37.)

The first opportunity when it could demonstrate its sense of of fairplay and goodwill towards the Maharaja came its way early in May, 1809. The advance of British troops towards the Sutlej having obliged Ranjit Singh to withdraw his own across that river, his authority in some of his possessions on its left bank had become weak. A few of them, taking advantage of the exclusion of his troops from the Cis-Sutlej area, had even thrown off their allegiance to him and resumed their former independence. In the same manner, the stronghold of Naraingarh, which had cost him more blood than any other of his contemporary conquests, was at this time in imminent danger of falling to one Kanwar Kishan Singh, who had laid siege to it. Confronted by these distressing developments, the Maharaja requested the British Government either to permit him to chastise the rebels and succour the beleaguered garrison, or to exert its own authority to restore to him his revolted possessions and compel the Kanwar to raise the siege of Naraingarh. The request was eminently reasonable, and the British Government was not to be found wanting in its regard for the legitimate interests of the Maharaja. Ochterlony, therefore, gladly interposed his influence to bring about a cessation of hostilities against Naraingarh. Many other places too, which had been seized by rebels, were restored in the same way to Maharaja Ranjit Singh without occasioning any bloodshed to his troops or expense to his exchequer.¹

Only two villages, Bhugta and Saiduki, remained to be restored, the occupant *zamindars* asserting that they had taken possession of them because they had purchased them from the Maharaja. They failed, however, to produce any documentary evidence in support of their claim, and the British Government was obliged, in consequence, to give its verdict against them. But they continued recalcitrant and refused to be persuaded to submit peaceably to the Maharaja's authority. However, when it was decided, as a last resort, to deprive them forcibly of these villages, they confounded Ochterlony by producing for the first time the sale deed bearing the seal of the Maharaja himself. The document was as authentic as it was conclusive, and Ochterlony was truly on the horns of a dilemma,

1. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, 21st May, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 16 (encl.), 1 p. 169—120).

unable to decide what to do. The negligence of the *zamindar* in sleeping over this crucial document till the very eleventh hour was certainly culpable, but it did not appear to him sufficient to warrant a confiscation of their villages for the purpose of being made over to Maharaja Ranjit Singh, who he was surprised to discover, had the impudence to prefer such a bogus claim. Lord Minto, nevertheless, was not disposed to disappoint the Maharaja once he had acknowledged his title to them and led him to expect their reversion to his authority. The original award in favour of the Maharaja was also supported by the declared resolution of the British Government to maintain possessions and rights exactly in the same state in which they existed at the time of Mr. Metcalfe's mission to Lahore. Accordingly, the villages in dispute were eventually made over to Maharaja Ranjit Singh, although the dictates of strict justice later compelled the British Government to compensate the despoiled *zamindars* at its own expense¹.

1. The machiavellian statecraft of Maharaja Ranjit Singh in obtaining the possession of these two villages which he had "virtually relinquished" though not "actually restored," the deplorable negligence of the *zamindars* in omitting to produce at the proper time the "discharge and release" certificate for them from Maharaja Ranjit Singh, and the difficulties which confronted the early British administrators in this country in the dispensation of justice to their new subjects are amply borne out by the documents bearing on this subject. The following are some of the more important of them:—

(a) Metcalfe to Edmonstone, 21st May, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 16 (encl.), pp. 169—180.)

(b) Edmonstone to Ochterlony, 1st July, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 19, pp. 196—223.)

(c) Ochterlony to Carey, 15th August, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10 (2nd), Srl. No. 281, pp. 101—102.)

(d) Ochterlony to Lushington, 15th October, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10, Srl. No. 23, pp. 43—46.)

(e) Mohkam Chand to Ochterlony, 25th December, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 11, Srl. No. 26, pp. 25—26.)

(f) Ochterlony to Mohkam Chand, 26th December, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 11, Srl. No. 27, p. 26.)

(g) Lushington to Ochterlony, 20th March, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 33, pp. 283—392.)

(h) Ochterlony to Sahib Singh, 10th April, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 11, Srl. No. 58, p. 50.)

(i) Ochterlony to Sahib Singh, 2nd May, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 11, Srl. No. 59 and 60, pp. 60—61.)

(j) Munshi Abul Nabi Khan to Ochterlony, undated. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 11, Srl. No. 61, p. 61.)

(k) Ochterlony to Lushington, 10th May, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10, Srl. No. 62, pp. 121—123.)

(l) Seton to Ochterlony, 17th May, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 4, Srl. No. 133, pp. 278—285.)

(m) Ochterlony to Lushington, 22nd May, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10, Srl. No. 64, pp. 128—236.)

But however anxious to conciliate Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the British Government never ceased to be a jealous guardian of its own rights and interests. The flat rejection of the Maharaja's claim to levy tribute from Sardar Gopal Singh of Manimajra, a protected chief is a case in point. The British Government refused even to examine this claim, for it was tantamount to an assertion of the Maharaja's sovereignty over one of the Cis-Sutlej States, from all of which he had been definitely excluded by the terms of the treaty with him¹.

The same intention to tolerate no infringement of the letter and spirit of the treaty with Maharaja Ranjit Singh is manifest from another instance. Nawab Attaullah Khan of Malerkotla had ransomed his territories from the Maharaja, who had taken forcible possession of them in October, 1808, by agreeing to pay to him a sum of 1,25,000 rupees. Of this he had paid on the spot Rs. 56,639-10-0 only, the balance of Rs. 68,360-6-0 having been stipulated to be paid later through the agency of Raja Bhag Singh of Jind, Bhai Lal Singh of Kaithal, Raja Sahib Singh of Patiala and Raja Jaswant Singh of Nabha, who had jointly stood guarantee for its due discharge and to whom large districts of Malerkotla had been made over in pledge thereof. Three months later, however, these chiefs found themselves compelled by the British Government to restore the *status quo ante* by returning these districts to the Nawab of Malerkotla. Yet the Maharaja, conveniently forgetting this fact, was reported to be bent upon recovering the unpaid balance from the guarantor chiefs. He was even alleged to have held out a threat to

(n) Edmonstone to Ochterlony 5th June, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 42, pp. 337—343.)

(o) Ochterlony to Edmonstone, 19th June, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10, Srl. No. 66, pp. 139—146.)

(p) Edmonstone to Ochterlony, 30th June, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 47, pp. 358—362.)

(q) Ochterlony to Edmonstone, 8th June, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10, Srl. No. 68, pp. 153—158.)

(r) Ochterlony to Seton, 8th July, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10 (2nd), Srl. No. 326, pp. 142-143.)

(s) Seton to Ochterlony, 19th July, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 16 (2nd), Srl. No. 75, pp. 373—380.)

(t) Edmonstone to Ochterlony, 28th July, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 49, pp. 373—375.)

(u) Edmonstone to Ochterlony, 16th August, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 51, pp. 377—384.)

1. Edmonstone to Ochterlony, 13th June, 1809 (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 16, pp. 161—180.)

them that if they did not fulfil their engagement, he would seize their dependants and property whenever they came on a pilgrimage to Amritsar or otherwise chanced to enter his dominions. The demand was clearly untenable, Ranjit Singh having already agreed, as a condition precedent to the conclusion of the treaty with him, to consider as null and void every transaction connected with his last expedition into the Cis-Sutlej territory. Accordingly, when these chiefs approached the British Government with a request to secure them their release from the engagement in question, it had no hesitation in publicly assuring them that the Maharaja would never be permitted to enforce this demand. The Maharaja himself, it appears, was only trying how far he might proceed to exact the unpaid balance. At any rate, the unequivocal declaration of the British Government in this connection proved sufficient to restrain him from venturing upon any aggression against the protected chiefs, and the demand was never resurrected.¹

But though these limitations were being accepted by Ranjit Singh with apparent resignation, the British Government was too wary so soon to lull itself into the belief that he had finally relinquished all his designs on the Cis-Sutlej area. Indeed, early in December 1809, he was reported to have given secret audiences to certain *vakils* from Scindhia, and Amir Khan, who were suspected to be contemplating hostilities against the British Government.² His generals and vassals, too, were reported to be flocking to his Court, troop movements on a large scale were rumoured from every quarter, and vast quantities of ammunition and stores were asserted to be collecting at his different depots.³ Moreover, some of these troops and materials were actually described as meant for a

1. (a). Seton to Ochterlony, 3rd August, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 16, Srl. No. 30, pp. 135—138.)

(b) Ochterlony to Seton, 10th August, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10 (2nd), Srl. No. 277, pp. 99-100.)

(c) Ochterlony to Edmonstone, 12th August, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10, Srl. No. 20, pp. 40-41.)

(d) Lushington to Ochterlony, 21st November, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 23, pp. 238—257.)

2. (a). Ochterlony to Lushington, 1st, 5th, 6th, 17th and 30th December, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10, Srl. Nos. 32—34, 39 and 43, pp. 55—64, 72—74 and 79—84.)

(b) A news-writer at Lahore to Ochterlony, undated. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 11, Srl. Nos. 28-29, pp. 27—29.)

3. Ochterlony to Lushington, 5th December, 1809. (P.G.R. Bk. No. 10, Srl. No. 33, pp. 56—59.)

punitive campaign in the vicinity of Phillaur on the right bank of the Sutlej.¹ Alarming as these reports and rumours were, they could not fail to attract the pointed attention of Lt.-Col. Ochterlony, who was determined not to be taken unawares. He, therefore, immediately decided to strengthen the British position at Ludhiana and to prepare for the worst. Provisions were thus stocked in the fort to lie in reserve and to last, in case of a siege, at least for that much time by which succour could be expected to arrive from Karnal; *chakkies* (hand-mills) were installed within the precincts of the fort itself to make the garrison independent of supplies of flour from outside; a ditch, too, was thrown round the fort and a wall constructed round the city itself.² Needless to add, these measures were later heartily approved of by the authorities at Calcutta.³

Ochterlony, however, soon after came to understand that the military preparations of Maharaja Ranjit Singh were rather defensive than offensive in character, his fears having been aroused by the formation of a permanent British cantonment at Meerut and the concentration of unusually large forces at the station.⁴ It had, of course, never been the intention of the British Government to invade the Punjab, or otherwise to subvert the rule of the Maharaja. It must have become apparent to him, too, when the British Government refused, even at this juncture, to lend any assistance or encouragement to the Gurkhas, who then contemplated a campaign against the fortress of Kangra, which had only lately been acquired by Maharaja Ranjit Singh.⁵ And so, as days and weeks passed by without the least of his apprehensions coming true, the Maharaja began once again to manifest signs of confidence in the British

1. Ochterlony to Lushington, 6th December and one undated, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10, Srl. Nos. 34 and 36-A, pp. 59—64 and 68-69.)

2. Ochterlony to Lushington, 6th and 31st December, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10, Srl. Nos. 34 and 44, pp. 59—64 and 85.)

3. Lushington to Ochterlony, 23rd January, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 30, pp. 271-272.)

4. (a) Ochterlony to Lushington, 18th and 22nd December, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10, Srl. Nos. 40 and 42, pp. 75-76 and 78-79.)

5. (a) Amar Singh Thappa (Gurkha Commander) to Ochterlony, received on the 15th December, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 11, Srl. No. 15, pp. 17—20.)

(b) Ochterlony to Lushington, 16th December, 1809. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10, Srl. No. 38, pp. 70—72.)

(c) Lushington to Ochterlony, 9th January, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 27, pp. 265-266.)

Government. In January, 1810, he even led away a major portion of the troops he had lately mobilised to distant campaigns on his other frontiers.¹

A fresh proof of the pacific intentions of the British Government was furnished to the Maharaja in the spring of 1810. Nawab Muzaffar Khan of Multan, who had then only narrowly escaped capitulation to the Maharaja but who apprehended a much more vigorous attack in the near future, was anxious to secure British aid in the defence of his dominion. He even offered to compensate the British Government by making over to it in perpetuity a large proportion of his revenues. But the British Government, true to its treaty of friendship with the Maharaja of Lahore, declined to render any assistance to the Nawab of Multan.² Ranjit Singh, whose anxiety to preserve peace with the British Government was not a whit less than that of the latter, did not take long to reciprocate this gesture of goodwill. In May 1810, he expelled from his dominions, unsolicited and in spite of the opposition offered by his co-religionists, an Akali fanatic, Bhai Phula Singh, who had wantonly attacked a British surveying party in the Patiala territory and escaped punishment by taking refuge in the Golden Temple at Amritsar.³ Lord Minto was so much pleased with this testimony of the Maharaja's disposition to cultivate friendly relations with the British Government that he decided to present to him a carriage and a pair of horses as a memento of his appreciation of the Maharaja's conduct on this occasion and to serve as a symbol of harmony between the two States.⁴

The passage of time now seemed to make Ranjit Singh more and more desirous of conciliating the British Government by every means in his power and of evincing to it his utmost regard for its

1. Ochterlony to Lushington, 20th and 21st January, and 16th March, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10, Srl. Nos. 47, 48 and 51, pp. 88—92 and 100.)

2. (a) Ochterlony to Lushington, 29th March, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10, Srl. No. 53, pp. 102.)

(b) Edmonstone to Ochterlony, 25th September, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6) Srl. No. 54, pp. 392—396.)

3. Ochterlony to Lushington, 8th May, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10, Srl. No. 61, pp. 120—121.)

4. (a) Edmonstone to Ochterlony, 29th May, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 40, pp. 332—334.)

(b) Frazer to Ochterlony, 25th February, 1811. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 7, Srl. No. 10, pp. 27—30.)

wishes and interests. His failure in March 1810, to wrest Multan from Nawab Muzaffar Khan had greatly hurt his pride and he was at this time raising a body of infantry, disciplined after the British manner, to help him win his cherished object and repair thereby his injured reputation. As was almost natural in the circumstances, a large number of British Indian soldiers from Ludhiana, lured by prospects of increased pay and improved position, began to desert to the Maharaja for service in the new battalions.¹ Nothing could have been more gratifying to Ranjit Singh than to welcome these trained soldiers; nor did he deny himself the services of quite a number of them. But he had no wish to give the British Government any umbrage on that score: as soon as he came to know that Ochterlony had addressed to him a representation on the subject, he caused his frontier to be immediately closed to all such deserters even before this communication had reached his hands. Not only that. Some of these deserters were actually made to recross the Sutlej, the Maharaja having publicly declared his resolution to recruit no more immigrants of this description.²

In another case, too, a single representation from Ochterlony proved sufficient at this time to achieve its purpose. Ranjit Singh had continued, even after the conclusion of the treaty with him, to levy *Rakhi*—a periodic exaction, supposed to be for immunity against attack—from some of the villages on the left bank of the Sutlej which were now avowedly under the protection of the British Government. Bhai Lal Singh and Raja Sahib Singh, to whom these villages belonged, having complained to Ochterlony against a recent extortion of this nature, the British Commandant immediately addressed a protest on the subject to Maharaja Ranjit Singh.³ The Maharaja not only readily acquiesced in the position taken up by Ochterlony denying him every right to demand any

1. Ochterlony to Lushington, 31st May, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10, Srl. No. 65, pp. 135—138.)

2. (a) Ochterlony to Edmonstone, 2nd August, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10, Srl. No. 70, pp. 161—164.)

(b) Edmonstone to Ochterlony, 25th August, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 53, pp. 390—391.)

3. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, 14th September, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10, Srl. No. 78, pp. 178—180.)

Peshkash, Nazrana, etc., from any village belonging to the protected Sardars, but actually returned to the aggrieved parties a sum amounting to over one thousand rupees which had been the subject of complaint.¹

Almost two years had now elapsed since Ochterlony first marched with his detachment to occupy the new frontier post at Ludhiana. But though much had happened during this interval to pacify the mutual apprehensions that had then arisen between the British Government and Maharaja Ranjit Singh, not all the civility and cordiality which both of them had later studied to demonstrate could yet succeed in disarming them completely of their mutual suspicions. Thus, in September 1810, when the usual season for the Maharaja to take the field was approaching, all sorts of rumours began once again to find currency and an early invasion of the Cis-Sutlej territory was confidently prognosticated by many. Ochterlony, of course, was still of the opinion that the military preparations of the Maharaja "indicated much more strongly an apprehension of attack than any hostile intention." But such was the persistency of these rumours and such his own habits of circumspection that he felt himself constrained to seek from his Government the requisite authority to invite defections from the Maharaja's army, should his intentions ultimately prove hostile towards the British Government. It was his firm belief that the support of many powerful elements in the Sikh army could easily be secured by immediately issuing to its Sardars a declaration assuring to every one of them who joined the British standard complete enjoyment of his existing property and rights on terms similar to those that had been granted to the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs.²

That there were quite a number of subordinate chiefs of Maharaja Ranjit Singh who were anxious to emancipate themselves from his exacting bondage had never been beyond the ken of the British Government. It was made indubitably clear to it by the receipt of a clandestine proposition, aimed at the overthrow of the power of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, which some of the more

1. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, 28th September, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 12, Srl. No. 3, pp. 6—8.)

2. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, 7th November, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 10, Srl. No. 74, pp. 174—177.)

disaffected of them thought it opportune to make to Ochterlony some time late in September 1810. The British Government, however, had no intention to avail itself of any offers of revolt, howsoever promising, to pursue schemes of aggrandisement against Maharaja Ranjit Singh, unless, of course, driven to tread this path in defence of its acknowledged rights. Ochterlony was, therefore, instructed to convey to the malcontents the determination of the British Government to have nothing to do with such intrigues and to sanction no departure from the course of amity with the Maharaja as long as he continued to abide by the terms of the treaty of April, 1809.¹

Ochterlony's zeal for the interests of his Government, however, seems to have outpaced his discretion in this instance, and he had to suffer a mild reproof for it. Without caring to wait for specific instructions on the subject of the overtures from the malcontents, he had judged it expedient to declare to them a disposition on the part of his Government to countenance their designs against the Maharaja, if only they could adduce convincing evidence of his hostile intentions towards it². Lord Minto considered this reply to have implicated his Government "in an inconvenient degree" in the project of revolt meditated by the disaffected subjects of the Maharaja. Not only was it likely, in his opinion, to encourage them to fabricate and exaggerate reports of a mischievous nature, it also ill became British professions of amity towards the Maharaja to enter into underhand negotiations against him. Besides, the mere fact of inimical intentions, even if proved to the entire satisfaction of the British Government, might not by itself have been sufficient at that time, for various reasons of policy, to provoke it to a rupture with Maharaja Ranjit Singh, at any rate so long as he did not actually violate the provisions of the treaty of 1809. Ochterlony was, therefore, once again enjoined to reject point-blank the overtures of the malcontents³. Needless to add that these instructions were fully carried out⁴, with the result that he

1. Edmonstone to Ochterlony, 9th October, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 57, pp. 431—433.)

2. Edmonstone to Ochterlony, 19th October, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 6, Srl. No. 60, pp. 450—454.)

3. *Ibid.*

4. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, 1st December, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 82, Srl. No. 11, pp. 35—38.)

contemplated rebellion died of inanition¹.

Maharaja Ranjit Singh, who could not have been unaware of the existence of these disruptive elements in his own dominions, was too shrewd to be oblivious of the great benefits he enjoyed by the maintenance of peace and friendship with the British Government. It was only when his southern frontier was thus secured by the presence of this friendly power beyond the Sutlej that he could devote his entire attention and resources to the consolidation of his existing possessions and the conquest of new lands to the northwards and westwards. If, on the contrary, the British Government had remained hostile, or even unfriendly, his resources, to say the least, would have been greatly encumbered and he might never have dared to embark upon schemes of further conquest, much less reduced and annexed extensive kingdoms like those of Kashmir, Multan, Jhang, etc. It was thus clearly his own interest to remain constant to the friendly alliance with the British Government and never to do anything which might estrange his relations with it. So greatly, indeed, did the passage of time impress him with the true value of this alliance to himself that he began almost to grasp at opportunities to demonstrate his confidence in the British Government².

Not that there were no further alarms to put the British Government on its guard against a possible invasion by the Maharaja. The approach of every autumn had been a signal for all sorts of reports, plausible as well as grotesque, to go into circulation, and that of 1811 was to be no exception in this respect. However, Ochterlony positively refused this time to believe that the Maharaja apprehended any attack from the British Government or that he himself meditated any. "Should either prove to be the case," he thus wrote to the Chief Secretary to Government, "I can only say that he has completely succeeded in . . . deceiving me into a belief of his confidence in us and of his own pacific

1. (a) Ochterlony to Edmonstone, 10th December, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 12, Srl. No. 12, pp. 38—40.)

(b) Ochterlony to Seton, 10th December, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 61, Srl. No. 22, pp. 19—20.)

2. (a) Ochterlony to Edmonstone, 15th December, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 12, Srl. No. 13, pp. 40—41.)

(b) Ochterlony to Edmonstone, 18th July, 1811. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 12, Srl. No. 24, pp. 65—68.)

intention. . .” and he dismissed all such reports and rumours as of the type of those “with which, at this season, I have always been compelled to trouble His Excellency in Council”.¹

A circumstance of singular importance at this time was the extension by Maharaja Ranjit Singh of an invitation to Ochterlony to join in the marriage celebrations of his son, Prince Kharak Singh, due to be held at Amritsar some time in February, 1812². The authorities at Calcutta having permitted him to accept or decline it according to his own discretion,³ Ochterlony decided to be present on the occasion with a view to gratify the Maharaja by this public manifestation of British friendship for him⁴. Accordingly, he crossed the Sutlej into the Punjab on the 2nd January, 1812, attended by a proper escort from his own detachment and a *markil* from Maharaja Ranjit Singh, who had been specially deputed by him to Ludhiana to accompany this distinguished guest to Amritsar and to look after his comfort and requirements *en route*⁵. Great was the reception accorded to Ochterlony on his approach to Amritsar, the ministers coming out a considerable distance to conduct him into the town and the Maharaja himself meeting him half a mile outside. His stay at Amritsar and Lahore, which lasted over a month, was sought in every way to be made the most agreeable to him, and the Maharaja, amidst all his preoccupations, seemed always to be on the look-out for opportunities to express his great confidence in the friendship of the British Government and his personal regard for Ochterlony. Costly presents were exchanged, the British representative making a marriage offering of five thousand rupees to Prince Kharak Singh alone and disbursing about fifteen thousand more on sundry other occasions, while the Sikh Court reciprocated by giving to Ochterlony and his suite a little over twelve thousand rupees in cash and souvenirs.⁶

1. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, 6th August, 1811. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 12, Srl. No. 27, p. 77.)

2. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, 18th July, 1811. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 12, Srl. No. 24, pp. 65—68.)

3. Edmonstone to Ochterlony, 16th August, 1811. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 7, Srl. No. 32, pp. 133—145.)

4. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, 15th October, 1811. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 12, Srl. No. 32, pp. 97—101.)

5. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, 23rd January, 1812. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 12, Srl. No. 39, pp. 125—129.)

6. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, 27th February, 1812. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 17, Srl. No. 42, pp. 134—141.)

The authorities at Calcutta were extremely gratified to learn of "the distinguished marks of attention and respect" with which the Court of Lahore had treated their representative during his visit to the Punjab. The cordiality which Ranjit Singh had been at pains to demonstrate on this occasion convinced the British Government not only of the sincerity of his desire to cultivate friendly relations with it, but also of "the complete eradication from his mind of every sentiment of jealousy and suspicion" which he had been known to entertain about its ultimate intentions towards him. British relations with Ranjit Singh had now definitely taken a happy turn, the credit "in a material degree" for which Lord Minto was glad to assign to "the prudence and ability" with which Ochterlony had discharged the duties of his situation at Ludhiana and conducted himself on his visit to the Maharaja.¹

Suspensions dispelled and confidence established instead, a rapid improvement in their relations was now only to be expected. Thus the military preparations of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, which used to occasion all sorts of alarmist rumours in the past, began henceforth to go almost unnoticed by Ochterlony, there appearing to him nothing in them to suggest any hostile move against the British Government. But that is, at its best, only a negative evidence of this increasing confidence. A more positive one is to be found in the ready condescension of the British Government to supply to the Maharaja in April, 1812, five hundred muskets from its own arsenal to help him equip some additional units of his army.² Nor was this the only occasion when Ranjit Singh asked for and got such help. The request was repeated in the spring of 1813 for the supply of a still larger number of firearms—a thousand more muskets and twenty thousand flintlocks.³ The British Government, desirous of gratifying the Maharaja, complied once again,⁴ and the requisite number was ordered to be made available to him.⁵

1. Edmonstone to Ochterlony, 20th March, 1812. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 7, Srl. No. 53, pp. 251—259.)

2. Monckton to Ochterlony, 15th April, 1812. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 7, Srl. No. 55, pp. 262—265.)

3. Ochterlony to Adam, 4th March, 1813. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 13, Srl. No. 27, pp. 70—73.)

4. Adam to Ochterlony, 9th April, 1813. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 8 (1st), Srl. No. 24, pp. 163—166.)

5. Adam to Ochterlony, 18th June, 1813. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 8 (1st), Srl. No. 40, pp. 223—24.)

The rest of the story of Anglo-Sikh relations during the first five years after the conclusion of the treaty of 1809 has not much in it to hold us for long. The determination of the British Government to countenance no designs against the power of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, whether sponsored by disaffected elements in his own dominions, or by the aggressive Gurkhas on his frontier, or even by the victim of his aggressions, the Nawab of Multan, has already been noted. The same sincerity of purpose is again manifest from its refusal to listen to any proposals of this nature, first in November 1813 from the *Subedar* of Kashmir,¹ then in December, following from the Shah of Kabul,² and still later in June 1814 from the *Killadar* of Lahore.³ The British Government seemed now to have shaken off every fear from the ambition of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, and the latter himself to have become supremely conscious of the great value to him of friendly relations with it. His resources in revenue were not very extensive. His man-power, too, could bear no comparison with that of the British Government. His soldiers, although physically strong and morally courageous, perhaps stronger and more courageous than the Hindustanians in the service of the British Government, were admittedly inferior to them in point of discipline and general efficiency.⁴ His slender stock of war materials, too, must have been another factor to discourage him from venturing upon a clash with the British Government. Besides, there yet lay on the other frontiers of his kingdom extensive territories like those of

1. Monekton to Ochterlony, 23rd November, 1813. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 8 (2nd), Srl. No. 67, pp. 349—354.)

2. Metcalfe to Ochterlony, 7th December, 1813. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 8 (2nd), Srl. No. 70, pp. 377—380.)

3. It is true that the overtures purporting to come from Sardar Hukma Singh, the Governor of the Fort of Lahore, proved eventually to be only forgeries contrived by a mean individual for selfish ends. Yet the fact remains that at the time they were delivered into Ochterlony's hands, they were believed by him to be genuine offers and were rejected as such by him and his Government. Their rejection, thus, is in no way less eloquent of the determination of the British Government to take no advantage of any circumstances, howsoever favourable, to overthrow or injure the power of Maharaja Ranjit Singh as long as he continued to abide by the terms of the treaty of April, 1809. *See*—

(a). Ochterlony to Adam, 5th July, 1814. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 13, Srl. No. 74, pp. 170—173.)

(b). Ochterlony to Adam, 6th June, 1814. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 13, Srl. No. 72, pp. 163—166.)

(c). Adam to Ochterlony, 29th June, 1814. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 8. (2nd), Srl. No. 87, pp. 463—466.)

4. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, 1st December, 1810. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 12, Srl. No. 11, pp. 35—38.)

Kashmir, Multan, Peshawar and the Derajat, which were much less strongly held and where he had been allowed a free hand by the treaty of 1809. He wisely decided, therefore, to concentrate all his territorial ambitions against these, which he was quite confident of being able to conquer one by one, provided he could secure his southern frontier by the maintenance of peace and friendship with the British Government. What wonder, then, if the Maharaja now appeared determined to woo the British Government by every means in his power and if the British Government itself had not the slightest fear of a stab in the back from Ranjit Singh when it launched upon an arduous campaign against the Gurkhas in the winter of 1814.¹

1, Ochterlony to Captain Birch, 25th October, 1814. (P. G. R. Bk. No. 8 (2nd), Srl. No. 98, pp. 527—534.)

"A book that is shut is but a block"

CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL LIBRARY

GOVT. OF INDIA
Department of Archaeology
NEW DELHI.

Please help us to keep the book
clean and moving.

S. P. 148. N. DELHI.